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Abstract
The rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as major emerging
powers has challenged existing important structures in the global economy. For this reason,
there is an expectation that this restructuring may also occur in the international tax regime. In
this respect, transfer pricing is one potential area for cooperation between the BRICS, which
have faced challenges in applying the existing international standard – the traditional arm’s
length approach as established by the OECD – in practice. Therefore, this thesis investigates
the differences between the transfer pricing regulations of the BRICS and those of the OECD,
examining the potential for cooperation between these countries and their impact on the
international tax debate. The author concludes that the substantial differences among the
BRICS prevent them from developing a unified and cohesive transfer pricing policy. However,
the BRICS have demonstrated an ability to individually influence the international transfer
pricing regime.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

Globalization has given rise to a great number of multinational enterprises1 (MNEs), which
have the capacity to place their businesses and activities anywhere in the world. Through
advances in technology, transportation and communications, companies operating their
business abroad may choose to do so by collaborating with independent enterprises or with
associated enterprises. In the first case, as the independent enterprises carry on their
business in their own interests by trying to maximise profits, transaction prices are
determined by market forces2. However, in the second circumstance, given the connections
between the companies and, consequently, the absence of market forces in their relations,
their intra-group transaction prices may deviate from what would have been negotiated
between independent parties.
Transactions within MNEs groups currently account for a significant volume of global
trade: there is evidence that more than 30 per cent of all international transactions consist
of intra-group transactions3. This means that a growing number of the existing international
transactions are no longer completely ruled by market forces, but by the interests of MNE
groups. For these reasons, establishing the appropriate price – the “transfer price” – for
intra-group transfers of goods, services and intangibles becomes an important global issue.
In the international tax area, transfer pricing assumes particular relevance as it determines

1

For the purposes of this thesis, the adopted concept of multinational enterprises is the one
established by Lorraine Eden, who defines MNEs as “two or more firms under common control,
with a common pool of resources and common goals, where the units of enterprise are located in
more than one country”. Lorraine Eden, Taxing Multinationals: Transfer Pricing and Corporate
Income Taxation in North America (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 126.
2
The Oxford Dictionary of Economics provides the following definition for market forces: “the
forces of supply and demand, that determine equilibrium quantities and prices in markets. These
are contrasted with the government and monetary authorities, which are able to some extent to
influence market forces”. John Black, Nigar Hashimzade and Gareth Myles. "market forces." In A
Dictionary of Economics. Oxford University Press, 2012.
3
Department of Economic & Social Affairs, United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing
for Developing Countries (New York: United Nations, 2013) at 1 [UN Practical Manual].

2

the income of each entity of the MNE group, influencing the tax base of the countries where
these entities are residents. This happens because, although business is increasingly global
and unlimited by national borders, taxation of MNE’s profits continues to be based on the
domestic laws of each country4, which use the independent enterprise approach5. Therefore,
if the pricing of intra-firm transactions is not effectively regulated, MNE’s profits can be
shifted to low or no tax jurisdictions, minimizing taxes and harmfully affecting the
revenues of the countries where the real economic activities occur.
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)6 has led efforts
to create measures to regulate transfer pricing matters. In its Model Tax Convention on
Income and on Capital7 (the “OECD Model Treaty”), the organization establishes the
Arm’s Length Principle (ALP) as the international standard to determine the reasonable
transfer price for international intra-group transactions. Nevertheless, Article 9 of the
OECD Model Treaty does not specify the methods for determining the arm’s length prices
and, when necessary, reallocating profits. A detailed application of the principle is provided
by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which, although not considered a formal source
of law, may have influences on customary norms and general principles of law. In this
sense, the OECD defines itself as a “market leader in developing standards and guidelines
in the core of International Taxation, such as the Model Tax Convention and Transfer
Pricing Guidelines (…) These standards are applied on a global basis”8.

4

John Henshall, Global Transfer Pricing: Principles and Practice. 2nd ed (Haywards Heath:
Bloomsbury Professional, 2013) at 3.
5
The independent enterprise approach recognizes the separate legal identity of corporations, even
when they are owned or controlled by the same group or person. Jinyan Li, Arthur Cockfield & J.
Scott Wilkie, International Taxation in Canada, 3rd ed (Markham: LexisNexis Canada) at 27.
6
The OECD is an advisory organization for economic cooperation established in 1961. According
to Article 5 of the organization’s convention, the OECD can take decisions that are binding on all
member countries, make recommendations, enter into agreements with members, non-members
countries and international organizations. OECD, Convention on the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (Paris: 14 December 1960).
7
OECD, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (Full
Version) (2014) [OECD Model Tax Convention].
8
OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Focus on Africa, online: Centre for Tax Policy
and Administration < http://www.oecd.org/ctp/40998413.pdf>.
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Considering that membership to the OECD is generally limited to developed countries, it
is important to investigate the role and limitations of its standards and governance methods
on a worldwide scale. With regard to OECD Member States, there is a well-defined
expectation of compliance with the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines9; however, the
influence and scope of this instrument in non-member countries are not so clear,
notwithstanding the OECD’s argument that it represents “internationally agreed principles
and provides valid guidelines for the application of the arm’s length principle”10.
In this regard, the economic rise of emerging countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, China
and South Africa (BRICS) – none of them members of the OECD – may represent a
challenge to the narrative that international tax law, particularly as it is defined by the
OECD, has reached international consensus. The economic performance and the growth of
the BRICS countries in the last decade has remodeled important structures in the global
economy. Thus, there is an expectation that this remodelling may also occur in the
international tax regime, in which the BRICS institutionalization and closer cooperation
may counterbalance the current dominant powers and contribute to redefining the existing
system. The area of transfer pricing seems to be promising in this respect as the BRICS
countries transfer pricing laws and practices present significant deviations from the OECD
traditional approach.
Therefore, this thesis will compare the BRICS transfer pricing practices in order to identify
the differences between each of them and between them and the international transfer
pricing standards established by the OECD. To the extent that these differences are
identified, this thesis will analyze their impact on the BRICS collective effect on the
existing transfer pricing system.

9

In its “Recommendation of the Council on the Determination of Transfer Pricing between
Associated Enterprises”, Amendment C (2016)79, the OECD instructs its Committee on Fiscal
Affairs to monitor the implementation of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines as amended in
cooperation with the authorities of Member countries. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on
the Determination of Transfer Pricing between Associated Enterprises (2016), online: OECD <
http://webnet.oecd.org/oecdacts/Instruments>.
10
OECD, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and Tax Administrations (Paris: OECD, 2014) [OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines].
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1.1

Research Objectives

This thesis has two main objectives. The first objective is to provide a comprehensive
analysis of the existing international transfer pricing regime and of the BRICS countries
transfer pricing laws. According to this research objective, this thesis will examine if there
are differences between the transfer pricing regulations of the OECD and those of the
BRICS countries and, to the extent that there are differences, this thesis will study their
impacts on the international transfer pricing regime. The second objective is to analyze the
potential for cooperation among the BRICS countries regarding their international transfer
pricing policies.

1.2

Methodology

In developing the research, this thesis will employ a comparative methodology between
the tax systems of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa concerning the treatment
given by these countries to transfer pricing issues as well as the convergences and
divergences among each of them, and in regards to the international standards established
by the OECD. According to the research objectives that guide this thesis, it will be firstly
necessary to diagnose what subjects and issues will be relevant for the comparison between
the legal systems.
Therefore, in order to establish the international standard on transfer pricing and how it has
evolved, this thesis will analyze relevant documents produced by the OECD regarding the
application of the ALP as an international principle to regulate transfer pricing. Then, the
transfer pricing laws11 and double taxation treaties currently in force in the BRICS
countries will be examined, limiting the scope of this analysis to Article 9 provisions of tax
treaties, which specifically deal with transfer pricing. Considering the importance of the

11

The study of laws integrating the legal systems of countries with such a cultural divergence,
geographic distance and linguistic variation limits the access to the information of the BRICS. For
these reasons, data collection for this thesis will be based on materials available on the World Wide
Web through international organizations, governments and institutions websites in which translated
primary legal sources are available. Additionally, this thesis will rely on secondary sources, such
as government documents, books, journals and periodicals.

5

positions and practices of the tax authorities in transfer pricing issues, special focus will be
directed to an examination of the BRICS representatives participation in international
organizations and initiatives.

1.3

Organization of Thesis

Apart from this introductory chapter and from the conclusion chapter, this thesis has four
main chapters. Chapter 2 will provide insight into the existing international transfer pricing
regime, examining the ALP and its relevant sources, such as the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines. Chapter 3 will set the stage for the subsequent study of the BRICS transfer
pricing rules, providing and overall analysis of these countries and explaining why they
may represent challenges to the international tax regime. Chapter 4 will individually
examine the transfer pricing laws of the BRICS countries. This chapter will describe
important factors such as the historical development of the BRICS transfer pricing
regulations, their current transfer pricing methods and their challenges and peculiarities in
applying the arm’s length principle. Chapter 5 will focus on the potential for cooperation
between the BRICS and discuss these countries influences on the international transfer
pricing regime.

6

Chapter 2

2

Transfer Pricing Concepts and International Standards

Transfer pricing is one of the most difficult challenges in international taxation. As
governments strive to preserve their tax bases in an increasingly integrated global
economy, establishing appropriate prices for related party cross-border transactions has
become a complex issue for taxpayers and tax administrations. The issue of transfer pricing
is relevant not only because of its complexity but also because it usually involves large
sums of taxes. Transfer pricing rules were developed to address problems related to the
mispricing of related party transactions. In this respect, the ALP is the international
standard included in Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty and UN Model Treaty, and
applied by several domestic legislations around the world.
This chapter offers an overview of the transfer pricing issue, which involves its
conceptualization, the ALP and other relevant international guidelines regulating the
matter. The objective of this chapter is to establish what are the international standards
regarding transfer pricing and how the standards operate in a global context. An
understanding of these international transfer pricing standards is fundamental in order to
compare them with and comprehend their influences on the BRICS transfer pricing
practices, which will be described in Chapter 4.

2.1 Transfer Pricing
Transfer pricing is the appropriate pricing of cross-border transactions between related
parties12, i.e., the amount that is charged between associated enterprises in their transfers
of goods, services or intangibles13. One simple way of understanding this concept and its

12

Eden, supra note 1 at 2.
Providing a broader definition for transfer pricing, the International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation (IBFD) International Tax Glossary describes it as “the area of tax law and
economics that is concerned with ensuring that prices charged between associated enterprises for
the transfer of goods, services and intangible property accord with the arm’s length principle”. Julie
Glabush, IBFD International Tax Glossary, 7th ed (IBFD, 2015).
13

7

implications in international tax law is to imagine the global profits of a Multinational
Enterprise (“MNE”) as a pie that needs to be divided, in a principled and fair manner,
between the different countries involved14. As modern MNEs are generally structured with
the parent company controlling directly or indirectly its subsidiaries, it can be extremely
complex to appropriately allocate profits among members of a multinational group15.
The main concern is that these intra-group prices may be different from the prices that
would have been agreed between two unrelated parties operating at arm’s length. This
difference, from a fiscal perspective, affects the amount of taxable income of the associated
enterprises involved in the transactions and hence the level of corporate income tax paid in
each country16. For instance, if the parent company of an MNE is resident in a high tax
jurisdiction and has a subsidiary in another country with a lower tax rate, the parent may
have an incentive to be over-charged in its transactions with its subsidiary, shifting profits
to a low tax jurisdiction in order to reduce the overall tax liability of the group17. In this
case, when the parent company pays above normal market prices to its subsidiary, it may
appear to be in financial difficulty; even though the MNE group as a whole is probably
achieving good profit margins. After all, although MNEs usually carry on their activities
through different corporations – treated by law as separate from each other and from their
owners – they usually operate as a single business in economic and financial respects18. In
the example above, the pricing manipulation is problematic to the country where the parent

14

Henshall, supra note 4 at 3.
Reuven Avi-Yonah, Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law (Northampton: Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2015) at 28 [Avi-Yonah, “Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law”].
16
Jérôme Monsenego, Introduction to Transfer Pricing (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law
International, 2015) at 3.
17
The United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing provides the following example to
illustrate transfer pricing issues: “A profitable computer group in Country A buys “solid state
drives” from its own subsidiary in Country B. The price the parent company in Country A pays its
subsidiary company in Country B (the “transfer price”) will determinate how much profit the
Country B unit reports and how much local tax it pays. If the parent pays the subsidiary a price that
is lower than the appropriate arm’s length price, the Country B unit may appear to be in financial
difficulty, even if the group as a whole shows a reasonable profit margin when the completed
computer is sold”. UN Practical Manual, supra note 3 at 1.
18
Li, Cockfield & Wilkie, supra note 18 at 105.
15

8

company is resident, which will not have the expected profits to tax as most of the income
will be allocated to the subsidiary company, resident in a country with lower taxes.
Therefore, transfer pricing assumes particular importance when the tax rates of the
jurisdictions involved in intra-group transactions are different, since MNEs have a genuine
interest in shifting profits through their transfer prices to low-tax countries19. In this respect,
the manipulation of transfer prices can cause two main negative consequences. First, it may
generate a harmful tax competition among countries because, as MNEs have the incentive
to increase their after-tax profits by allocating their taxable income to low-tax jurisdictions,
countries may progressively reduce their tax rates in order to attract MNEs, resulting in
what some have called a ‘race to the bottom’20. Second, since international transfer pricing
manipulation is a strategy only available for MNEs, it also provides them a
disproportionate advantage in relation to their domestic counterparts.
This manipulation of transfer prices has led governments and international organizations
to create ways of controlling transfer pricing under domestic and international tax law.
Since the United Kingdom implemented its first transfer pricing regulation in 1915,
countries have been exploring ways in which the manipulation of transfer prices and its
aforementioned consequences can be minimized21. The ultimate result is a broad
international consensus that transfer prices have to follow the “arm’s length” standard,
which comprises a hypothetical analysis of how the related enterprises would have
negotiated if they were independent from each other.

2.2

The Arm’s Length Principle

The Arm’s Length Principle (“ALP”) – incorporated into the domestic law of
approximately 100 countries22 – is codified by Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty, which

19

Ibid.
Eduardo Baistrocchi, “The Transfer Pricing Problem” in Eduardo Baistrocchi and Ian Roxan,
eds, Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 10 at 11
[Baistrocchi, “The Transfer Pricing Problem”].
21
Ibid.
22
UN Practical Manual, supra note 3 at 31.
20

9

is the framework for bilateral tax treaties between OECD members and many non-member
governments, as follows:
Article 9 “Associated Enterprises”: 1. Where: a) an enterprise of a
Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the management,
control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or b) the
same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control
or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the
other Contracting State, and in either case conditions are made or imposed
between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which
differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises,
then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one
of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued,
may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly23.
According to Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty, also incorporated in the UN Model Tax
Convention, profits may be reallocated when conditions in commercial and financial
transactions between related enterprises are different from those which would have been
made between independent enterprises25. The underlying assumption is that independent
parties performing a business transaction always seek to maximize their own profits and,
through this negotiation process, a fair profit – proportional to the functions performed,

2323

OECD Model Tax Convention, supra note 7.
Article 9 “Associated Enterprises”: 1. Where: (a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates
directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting
State, or (b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital
of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State, and in either
case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial
relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any
profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason
of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed
accordingly. Department of Economic & Social Affairs, United Nations Model Double Taxation
Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries (New York: United Nations, 2011) [UN
Model Convention].
25

10

assets employed and risks assumed – is achieved by each enterprise26. Therefore, the ALP
establishes that “the division of income among companies within a commonly controlled
group should be based on estimates of how the income would be divided if the commonly
controlled companies were instead unrelated companies, acting with respect to one another
at arm’s length”27. Consequently, in order to determine the reasonable transfer price, it is
necessary to compare intra-group transactions to transactions between unrelated entities28.
The OECD argues that the ALP is the preferred basis for pricing related-party transactions
because it provides a more equal treatment for tax purposes between associated and
independent enterprises; avoiding the creation of tax advantages or disadvantages that
would otherwise distort the competitive positions of each type of entity29. The OECD,
nonetheless, recognizes some problems in the application of the ALP, particularly when
there are no readily available comparable transactions, when relevant comparable data is
difficult to find or when the MNE’s transaction would not be entered into by independent
enterprises30. In this respect, Jeffrey Owens, a former official of the OECD, also recognizes
a number of problems in applying the ALP, especially because of the absence of
comparable transactions and because of the burden it creates for taxpayers and tax
administrations31.
These difficulties arise mainly because MNEs perform their businesses in a different way
from independent enterprises in terms of the allocation of risks and structure of
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transactions32. Indeed, in multinational transactions, “parties are not ‘independent’
economic actors even though they have separate legal existences, and do not really bargain
with each other in the sense typical for parties that have genuinely independent, and
accordingly adverse or competitive interests”33. This makes the assumption of establishing
an objective price by comparing MNEs with independent enterprises somewhat artificial34.
However, despite these problems, the OECD concludes that the ALP is still better than any
other approach35 so far presented36.
The theory underlying the ALP is based on market forces: according to the supply and
demand of a certain good or service, the market forces will usually result in a price that is
acceptable to both parties at a given point in time37. Following this theory, when the prices
paid for international transactions between independent parties are acceptable to both
parties, there is an assumption that their income, as well as their resulting income taxes,
will also be acceptable to the tax administrations of the countries where their business
activities are located38. From a theoretical perspective, the ALP is an essentially neutral
standard, as it is applied in transactions between associated enterprises regardless of their
country of residence. There are, nevertheless, arguments against the applicability of the
ALP in developing and emerging countries, especially with respect to the absence of
comparable transactions, which will be further explored in the following chapters.
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2.2.1

The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines

Although the ALP concept provided in Article 9 is straightforward, its application in
practice is much more complex. First, it is necessary to ascertain whether or not prices and,
consequently, taxable profits have been influenced by the connection between the parties
and, second, if so, how these profits should be recalculated to achieve the appropriate
transfer price39. In this context, the OECD has been active40 in recommending how to
correctly assess arm’s length pricing by producing its Transfer Pricing Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations41, referred in this thesis as the “OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines”. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are the “most
comprehensive model of legal regulation of transfer pricing to date since the inception of
corporate income tax systems at the beginning of the twentieth century”42.
Since neither Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty nor Article 9 of the UN Model Treaty
provide specific procedures for determining arm’s length prices or allocating profits, the
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines provide guidance to MNEs and tax administrations in
the application of the ALP. The guidelines represent a revision and compilation of previous
transfer pricing reports published by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs and focus on
helping “tax administrations (of both OECD member countries and non-member countries)
and MNEs by indicating ways to find mutually satisfactory solutions to transfer pricing
cases, thereby minimizing conflict among tax administrations and between tax
administrations and MNEs”43.
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2.2.1.1

Transfer Pricing Methods

The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines stipulate five methods for assessing the appropriate
transfer price in transactions between associated enterprises. The traditional transactional
pricing methods are: a) the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method; b) the resale
price method; and c) the cost plus method. The transactional profit methods are: a) the
profit split method; and b) the transactional net margin method44.
Under the CUP method, there is a comparison between the price charged for property or
services in a controlled transaction and the price charged for property or services in a
comparable uncontrolled transaction in comparable circumstances45. If this assessment
demonstrates a difference between the two prices, there may be an indication that the intragroup transaction price is not at arm’s length46. The application of this method is indicated
for cases in which the associated enterprise buys or sells a product or service and there are
comparable non-arm’s length transactions in similar quantities and similar terms47.
The resale price methodology involves the subtraction of a gross profit margin from the
price that would have been sold to an independent enterprise. The OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines describe the application of this method as follows:
The resale price method begins with the price at which a product that has
been purchased from an associated enterprise is resold to an independent
enterprise. This price (resale price) is then reduced by an appropriate gross
margin on this price (“resale price margin”) representing the amount out of
which the reseller would seek to cover its selling and other operating
expenses and, in the light of the functions performed (taking into account
assets used and risks assumed), make an appropriate profit. What is left after
subtracting the gross margin can be regarded, after adjustment for other
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costs associated with the purchase of the product (e.g. customs duties), as
an arm’s length price for the original transfer of property between the
associated enterprises48.
The cost-plus method begins with the costs incurred by the supplier of property or services
in a controlled transaction with a related purchaser. Then, an appropriate mark-up –
calculated based on similar and comparable transactions – is added to remunerate the
supplier for its functions, assets used and risks assumed49.
Under the transactional profit split method, the total taxable income between the related
enterprises is allocated to each party in accordance with its contribution to the profit50. This
methodology is suitable to situations where the roles of the associated enterprises in an
international transaction are so interconnected that it becomes very difficult to evaluate
them in a separate fashion51. The transactional net margin method has a similar application
to the profit split method: the difference is that, while the latter is applied to all participants
in the intra-group transaction, the former is applied to one participant, by comparing the
“net profit margins derived from a transaction involving related parties with net profit
margins realized by unrelated parties from similar transactions52”.

2.2.1.2

Legal Status of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines

The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are the international standard adopted by member
and some non-members countries of the OECD in their domestic legislation and double
tax conventions53. In this context, some scholars argue that the OECD Guidelines are the
main legal source of an international transfer pricing regime, which is one of the
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Henshall, supra note 4 at 28.
50
Li, Cockfield & Wilkie, supra note 18 at 125.
51
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fundamental structures of an international tax regime54. According to this conception,
there is an international understanding that these guidelines are the agreed interpretation of
the ALP established in Article 9 in regards to the application of tax treaties that follow the
OECD Model Treaty55.
The application of the ALP and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines has also expanded
into the legal systems of countries that are not members of the OECD. There is a trend
towards the reshaping of domestic transfer pricing rules in order to align them with the
standards established in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. This process is
significantly influenced by the negotiation of a great number of treaties according to Article
9 of the OECD Model Treaty56. In other words, an effective application of Article 9 may
demand a coordinated interpretation in line with the OECD Guidelines, as explained by
José Calderón:
The Transfer Pricing Guidelines have been used to uniform, harmonize or
to even “standardize” the configuration, interpretation and application of
the arm's length principle and all the legislation on transfer pricing at an
international level. The OECD soon noticed that the only way to eliminate
the serious conflicts that can arise from an asymmetrical interpretation or
application of this principle by the different states was through the
articulation of guidelines that would shape the arm's length principle in a
uniformed and internationally agreed form. That is to say, through an
instrument of soft law, flexible and dynamic as the Guidelines are58.
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In this context, a soft law59 approach to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines seems to
offer a third way between describing these rules as “law” – which would mean that states
are legally bound by it – and describing them as “not law at all” – which would overlook
the evidence that countries do comply with the rules, frequently against their self-interest60.
After all, the mere fact that recommendations from international organizations are not
legally binding does not mean that they have no effect because a legal obligation is just
one of the reasons for complying with a rule, particularly in international law, where
sanctions are often illusory61. Indeed, Hugh Ault, examining the role of OECD’s
commentaries in the interpretation of tax treaties, affirms that, although treaty parties are
free to deviate from the guidance suggested by the organization, the presumption is that
their interpretation represents the intention of the parties62.
It is important to emphasize, nonetheless, that although the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines are broadly relied on, there are still different interpretations regarding transfer
pricing issues from MNEs and countries’ tax administrations. Despite intending to
represent internationally agreed principles, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are not
fully accepted by all countries, particularly by those developing and emerging countries
that are not members of the organization, as evidenced by the following comment of China
in the UN Practical Manual:
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and
Tax Administrations (the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines) have been the
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“gold standard” for tax administrations and taxpayers to apply the “arm’s
length principle” for the valuation, for tax purposes, of cross-border
transactions between related parties for much of the period since the original
version of the guidelines was first issued in 1995. As the world economy
becomes increasingly globalized, transfer pricing is an issue faced not only
by developed countries, but is increasingly a critical matter for developing
countries. Such nations face a set of unique issues that have not been
addressed, or at least not sufficiently or practically addressed by the OECD
Guidelines. Therefore, while much of the OECD guidelines may still be
applicable to developing countries, the UN Practical Manual should put a
special focus on offering practical solutions to issues faced by developing
countries63.
In order to create a more balanced relationship between developed and developing
countries in terms of transfer pricing regulations and interpretations, the UN Committee of
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters has published a manual specifically
for developing countries, further analyzed in the next section.

2.2.2

The UN Practical Manual

The United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries (the
“UN Practical Manual”) – whose first version was approved by the UN Tax Committee
on October 2012 and launched publicly in the Economic and Social Council Chamber of
the United Nations on May 2013 – is intended to be a “living document”, to be modified
and updated, based on the OECD’s Guidelines and on the ALP64. The UN Practical Manual,
thus, was drafted “as a response to the need, often expressed by developing countries, for
clearer guidance on the policy and administrative aspects of applying transfer pricing
analysis to some of the transactions of multinational enterprises (MNEs)”66.
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On April 2017, the United Nations Committee of Experts in International Cooperation in
Tax Matters released a revised UN Practical Manual. The revised Manual was drafted
alongside the OECD/Group of Twenty (G20) Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting (BEPS) to reflect the developments in the area of transfer pricing analysis and
administration since the Manual’s first edition, especially regarding developments in
developing countries67.
Having representatives of Brazil, India, China and South Africa – four of the five BRICS68
– participating in the development of the document, the UN Practical Manual evidences
the growing importance of the BRICS in the area of international taxation. In Parts A
through C, the Manual often follows the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, reflecting the
operation of Article 9 of the UN Model Treaty and the ALP embodied in it69. The
significant difference of the Manual is in Part D, where Brazil, China, India, Mexico and
South Africa individually described their viewpoints and experiences in dealing with
transfer pricing. These country practices, nonetheless, do not necessarily reflect the UN
Subcommittee’s views on transfer pricing as it was stated in the forewords to both the 2013
and 2017 UN Practical Manual editions:
While consensus has been sought as far as possible, it was considered most
in accord with a practical manual to include some elements where consensus
could not be reached, and it follows that specific views expressed in this
Manual should not be ascribed to any particular persons involved in its
drafting. [Part D] is different from other chapters in its conception, however.
It represents an outline of particular country administrative practices as
described in some detail by representatives from those countries, and it was

67

Ibid.
Russia does not have a representative member in the U.N. Committee of Experts on International
Cooperation in Tax Matters and, for this reason, the views of the country are not highlighted in
Chapter 10 of the Transfer Pricing Manual.
69
The UN Manual is divided in four parts. Part A refers to transfer pricing in a global environment;
Part B explores the arm’s length principle, providing guidance on principle and policy aspects; Part
C relates to the practical implementation of a transfer pricing system in developing countries; and
Part D contains country’s transfer pricing practices. UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at VI-V.
68

19

not considered feasible or appropriate to seek a consensus on how such
country practices were described. [Part D] should be read with that
difference in mind70.
Although not reflecting an official position from the United Nations, the countries’
practices exposed in Part D of the UN Practical Manual demonstrate some common
challenges and themes in the area of transfer pricing between the BRICS countries. China,
India and South Africa, for instance, used the document to emphasize the importance of
considering location-specific advantages (“LSAs”) in the determination of the arm’s length
prices of the companies resident in its territories. The UN Practical Manual also reveals
some unique approaches, such as the Brazilian transfer pricing system, which does not rely
on comparable transactions but rather on predetermined margins to achieve the adequate
transfer price71.

2.3
The Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action
Plan
Following the financial crisis of 2008 – when many countries faced high levels of public
debt and pressure to generate more tax revenue – governments across the world became
much more vocal about their concerns regarding international tax avoidance schemes,
acknowledging how traditional tax policies and principles have not kept pace with the
advances in cross-border trade generated by the rise of information and communication
technology72. Since 2008, media reports and the empirical literature73 have also highlighted
how highly profitable MNEs appeared to pay comparatively little income taxes in the
countries where their income was effectively earned. In this respect, although some authors
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argue that the impact of BEPS on tax revenues is only modest in magnitude74, there is
significant evidence that MNEs arrange their affairs in a tax-sensitive manner and usually
report higher profit rates in low-tax jurisdictions than in high-tax jurisdictions, from which
it is possible to infer that BEPS is a relevant problem75.
Therefore, in 2013, following the political G20 mandate76, the OECD published the Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) Report77 and its Action Plan78. According to the
OECD, BEPS refers to tax avoidance schemes that manipulate gaps and differences in tax
regulations to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax jurisdictions79. In this respect,
considering the common awareness that governments are losing substantial corporate tax
revenue because of MNE’s strategies aimed at shifting profits to countries where they are
subject to more favourable tax treatments80, the BEPS Report recognizes and openly
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discusses the weaknesses in the international tax architecture designed by the OECD and
by its member-countries81.
The BEPS Action Plan calls for essential changes in the existent tax system mechanisms
as well as the adoption of new ‘consensus-based’ approaches designed to prevent base
erosion and profit shifting82. Thus, the Action Plan establishes the following fifteen actions
that, when implemented internationally and domestically, will have an impact on current
tax avoidance issues.
1. Address the tax challenges arising from the digital economy.
2. Neutralize the effect of hybrid mismatch arrangements.
3. Strengthen CFC rules.
4. Limit base erosion through interest deductions and other financial payments such
as insurance arrangements and derivatives.
5. Improve transparency and ensure transactions have substance.
6. Prevent tax treaty abuse.
7. Prevent artificial avoidance through permanent establishments.
8. Prevent BEPS created by moving intangible assets among group members.
9. Prevent BEPS created by allocating risk or excessive capital to group members.
10. Prevent BEPS created through high-risk transactions that would not occur between
unrelated parties.
11. Establish methodologies to collect and analyze data on BEPS.
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12. Require taxpayers to disclose aggressive tax planning arrangements.
13. Re-examine documentation requirements.
14. Make dispute resolution through the mutual agreement procedure more effective.
15. Develop a multilateral instrument under tax and public international law to enable
jurisdictions to implement measures to combat BEPS83.
After two years of work within the OECD and after public consultation, the BEPS final
reports on the actions were published in October 201584. In February 2016, during the G20
meeting in China, the group leaders endorsed the BEPS final reports, supporting a
consistent implementation of the BEPS package85.
One of the typical profit shifting opportunities generated by the interaction of international
and domestic taxation rules is in the area of transfer pricing. One fundamental assumption
of the arm’s length standard is that the more extensive are the functions, assets and risks of
one party in a transaction, the greater this party is expected to be remunerated and vice
versa86. According to this logic, MNEs have the incentive to shift their functions, assets
and risks to jurisdictions where they will receive a more favourable tax treatment. Although
central functions may be difficult to be shifted, the risks and the ownership of intangible
assets may be more easily contractually allocated to low-tax jurisdictions87. This shifting
of income through such transfer pricing arrangements – particularly those related to risks
– was not effectively regulated in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which “are
perceived by some as putting too much emphasis on legal structures (as reflected, for
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example, in contractual risk allocations) rather than on the underlying reality of the
economically integrated group”88, contributing to BEPS.
In this sense, the BEPS Action Plan demands improvements in the current transfer pricing
rules89 in order to “put more emphasis on value creation in highly integrated groups,
tackling the use of intangibles, risks, capital and other high-risk transactions to shift
profits”. The OECD's principal recommendations regarding transfer pricing are for
countries to: a) revise allocation rules to attribute risks to related parties according to their
control and financial capacity; b) revise allocation rules to avoid that the legal ownership
of intangibles represents the only determinant of the source of their income; c) revise
allocation rules to attribute value to associate enterprises performing important functions
and; d) limit non-controlling companies to risk-free return on financial transactions90.
Overall, it is possible to observe that transfer pricing and the ALP constitute the basis of a
number of actions developed by the OECD under the BEPS project, being one fundamental
aspect in avoiding base erosion and profit shifting.

2.4

Conclusion

Transfer pricing, which refers to the appropriate allocation of global profits between group
members of MNEs, is an extremely complex issue, affecting governments and taxpayers
from across the world. In order to address this issue, the ALP attempts to ensure that an
appropriate price is charged between related parties in their cross-border transactions.
However, notwithstanding the widespread adoption of this principle, its application
remains challenging when there are no comparable transactions available, especially in the
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cases of developing and emerging countries. There are two important legal sources in the
international transfer pricing area that provide recommendations on the application of the
ALP: the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the UN Practical Manual. The first,
although recognized by some scholars and countries as a representation of internationally
agreed principles, is increasingly questioned by developing and emerging countries. The
latter, on the other hand, attempts to provide specific guidance for developing countries in
dealing with transfer pricing. None of these two seem to effectively and globally addressed
the issue of transfer pricing, which, among other factors, motivated the creation of the
OECD/G20 BEPS initiative in 2013.
This new international tax and transfer pricing stage started with the BEPS initiative marks
the beginning of the participation of more countries in creating international transfer
pricing standards. Among these countries, one influential group is formed by the BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), which is examined in the following
chapter.
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Chapter 3

3

The BRICS Countries

The acronym BRICs was formulated by Jim O’Neill, former chief economist of Goldman
Sachs, in a paper written in 2001 where the author proposed that, considering their
economic performance in the 1990s, Brazil, Russia, India and China could be the drivers
of the world economic growth in the next decade91. O’Neill’s reason for grouping together
these countries was that they were all experiencing fast economic growth and becoming
important emerging economic powers92.
Following the global economic crisis of 2007-2008, while the world suffered a severe slowdown in its economy, the BRICs countries engaged in a rapid recovery93. According to
Goldman Sachs, the consequences of the 2008 crisis essentially enhanced the relevance of
the rise of the BRICs countries94. Indeed, the growth in the domestic demand among the
BRICs had a significant role in achieving global economic recovery, especially considering
the need of developed countries for new export markets in face of the decreased demand
in their domestic economies95.
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More than a decade after the formulation of the acronym BRICs, the discussion over the
real possibility of a change of roles in the global economy, as predicted by O’Neill, gains
new chapters every day. The BRICs – now BRICS with the inclusion of South Africa
membership in 201196 – continue to promote the rapprochement between its members.
Also, in recent years, there has been a dramatic growth in the importance of emerging
countries in the global economic development and, consequently, the BRICS countries may
affect the current international taxation scenario.
This chapter discusses how and why the BRICS may be viewed as a globally influential
group in the international tax area. The objective is to provide an overall perspective of the
BRICS as individual countries – analyzing their main differences and similarities – and as
an institution, establishing a framework for understanding the way in which they present
challenges for the international transfer pricing regime.

3.1 Globalization and the BRICS
The BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) were not grouped together because
of natural, historical, cultural, political or linguistic reasons. It is an economic concept that
connect these countries as “the choice of Brazil, Russia, India and China is nothing but a
focus on the four emerging markets with the largest GDP (at purchasing power parity) and
on their four big populations becoming more productive”97. The grouping of these countries
represents a transformation in the international order, in which “the world’s economic
center of gravity has moved towards the east and south, from OECD members to emerging
economies […] This realignment of the world economy […] represents a structural change
of historical significance”98.
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One important similarity among the BRICS economic development is the fact that, over
the last three decades, these countries adopted decisive policies towards opening up their
economies to the international market. Brazil, following a long period of military
dictatorship, has, since the beginning of the 1990s, extended the opening of its internal
market to imports, stabilized its economy and experienced significant improvements in its
trade balance. Concurrently, Russia, after the end of the communist system – which had
been in place since 1917 – began to substitute its economic model focused on domestic
production for a system with greater international trade openness99. India, in response to
the country’s low rates of development as well as inflation problems since the 1960s, also
started its commercial opening in the early 1990s. Some scholars argue that this change
was fundamental for India to reach the levels of growth the country has been experiencing
since the first decade of this century100. China, having restructured and expanded private
participation in national economic activity since 1978, experienced an unprecedented rural
exodus in the 1990s, resulting in millions of people moving to cities in search for jobs in
the large private enterprises established in Shanghai and Beijing101. At this point, the
Chinese government promoted the gradual opening of its market to foreign companies and
investors, also seeking better access to western markets. South Africa, after its democratic
reform in 1994, moved away from international isolation towards greater integration with
the world economy, beginning to attract capital inflows and to reduce its restrictions on
capital outflows102.
The 1990s was a decade when all BRICs economies were restructured according to a new
world reality, which was being opened to new players through what was then called
globalization. Unsurprisingly, the opening up of these countries’ economies to
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international trade forced their enterprises, governments and institutions to adapt
themselves in order to improve their insertion to the global market. This is a fundamental
aspect in understanding why the BRICS, in that period, took the initiative to develop or
update, among other things, domestic transfer pricing provisions.
The accelerated pace of globalization is also leading to a “rebalancing of economic
influence, with political power shifting from the West to the East”103. In this context, the
BRICS, where new consumer markets are opening up and where a middle class is
emerging, also arise as significant sources of foreign direct investment, especially into
developing countries104.

3.2 Overall Perspective
The BRICS countries account for about one fourth of the world’s Gross National Product
(GNP), their population corresponds to 40% of the world’s total and, together, they occupy
more than 25% of the world’s land area105. The economies of these countries vary
considerably106: China is a strong manufacturer and service provider, being the most
populous country in the world, the second largest economy (after the United States of
America) in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and occupying the second largest
land area (after Russia); India is a leading country in the service supply category, being the
10th largest economy in the world; Russia and Brazil are relevant raw material suppliers,
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although Brazil is also a provider of manufactured goods and services and; South Africa –
the most recent BRICS member – has a smaller economy107, serving as a strategic African
partner in the group108.
Essentially, the main political and economic common characteristic between the BRICS is
that they are all rapidly emerging economies, most of them having had direct experiences
as colonies under European imperialism109. On the other hand, one of the main
dissimilarities among these countries is the division existent between the democratic
members of the group (Brazil, India and South Africa) and Russia and China110. The
inclusion of South Africa in the BRICS, some authors argue, has also created more
difficulties in developing a collective BRICS identity, since the African country is a
democracy with close relations to Western economies and it is supposed to represent all 54
diverse nations of Africa111, having less common causes with Brazil, Russia, India and
China.
Regardless of the differences between their tax systems and international tax policies, the
BRICS countries share common aspects that are important for the contemporary
international tax policy debate. First, all of them see themselves as emerging and
developing powers, as explained by Niall Duggan:
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The BRICS have developed a large network of interactions and have
institutionalised areas of cooperation. The basis for the development of
these interactions has been a common self-identity as an emerging and
developing power. Within this self-identity is a commonly held perception
that the current system of global governance does not represent the interests
of emerging powers and that without reform or the development of an
alternative system, emerging powers would fail to develop fully112.
Besides that, all the BRICS countries have been capital importers – and consequently
source-based countries – that are progressively becoming capital exporters and assuming
residence country roles113. This duality is revealed by the BRICS countries tax treaty
history, which reflects a path of increasing economic power and decreasing dependence on
attracting foreign investments114. According to Diane Ring, “this duality is important in
shaping their influence on the OECD, their ability to act as a unified group and their
likelihood of representing the interests of developing groups outside the BRICS group”115.
The necessity of the BRICS countries in improving their domestic tax laws and tax treaty
networks – essentially because of their unique position as emerging economies – is also
one commonality between them. This mutual necessity reflects in the interest these
countries have in cooperating with each other:
There are significant differences in [the BRICS] economic position, as
reflected in their tax treaty policy. There are, however, also commonalities,
such as rapidly growing economies which require major public investments
in education and infrastructure to continue realizing the planned growth for
the benefit of more groups among their large – and often, still very poor –
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populations. Thus, there is a shared interest in improving domestic and
international tax law and treaties so as to facilitate such growth, as well as
in capacity building within tax administrations to effectively deal with more
complicated tax rules and to achieve the needed increase in government
revenue. In view of this, there is no doubt a shared interest for the BRICS
countries to exchange experiences and to support each other in these
areas116.
Therefore, although it is not clear whether the BRICS countries could act as an unified
group, the way their economies have developed over time may give rise to common
interests and understandings regarding international tax policies, which may be different
from the perspectives of OECD countries117. The main concern is that, if the BRICS
dissonant positions from the OECD are the principal link between them, then it will always
be easier for them to merely express their opposition to ‘Western’ policies and institutions
than to develop a cohesive international tax policy agenda or concrete proposals on
reforming the existing system.

3.3 The Tax Systems of the BRICS: Similarities and
Differences
The tax systems of the BRICS, reflecting their economic, political and social
characteristics, have considerable differences between them. Regarding the BRICS
countries’ tax burdens, for instance, it is possible to note a significant dissimilarity between
India, which has the lowest tax burden of approximately 12% of GDP and Brazil, which
has the highest tax burden of around 38% of the GDP. In general, the BRICS tax burdens
are below the OECD average level, except for Brazil and South Africa118. The tax structures
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of the BRICS countries are also contrasting: Brazil gives greater importance to taxes on
consumption, while Russia and South Africa rely more heavily on taxes on income and
profits119.
These dissimilarities can be attributed mainly to the different economic roles played by
each of the BRICS countries in the global market. In terms of foreign direct investment,
for example, China is a major FDI recipient whereas India receives smaller amounts120,
which may influence the variations in how these countries deal with the competitiveness
of their tax systems. The level of informality is also notably different in the BRICS
countries – India has the largest informal economy between them and Russia has the
smallest121 – affecting the range of their tax bases as well as the level of simplicity and
practicability of their tax systems.
One similarity between the BRICS countries in their tax systems is that all five countries
are more likely to prioritize source-taxation than more developed countries, where the
OECD Model Tax Treaty is usually strictly followed. According to Kim Brooks:
They [the BRICS] stake this ground in different ways in negotiating their
bilateral tax treaties: sometimes by raising the threshold for the taxation of
business income, sometimes by negotiating to increase the amount of
income that might be allocated to a permanent establishment, sometimes by
pushing for higher withholding tax rates on interest returns, often by trying
to explicitly ensure that technical services may be taxed at sources, and
usually by preserving source taxation of other income122.
Nevertheless, comparing the BRICS countries’ present international tax policies to the
policies they had in the past – before 2001, when the Goldman Sachs’ paper grouped them

119

Ibid.
Ibid at 359.
121
Ibid.
122
Kim Brooks, “International Tax Policy: The Counter-Story Presented by the BRICS” in Yariv
Brauner and Pasquale Pistone, eds, BRICS and the Emergence of International Tax Coordination
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 2015) 447 at 466.
120

33

– it is possible to note that all of them are advancing towards reducing taxation at source123.
The extent of this reduction varies between the BRICS countries because, since each one
of them has reached a different stage of development in becoming a capital exporting
country, their tax policies are also different. In this sense, while China and India encourage
its resident companies to invest abroad, Brazil still sees itself as a capital importing country
and Russia, until recently, saw the possibility of investing abroad with suspicion124.

3.4 BRICS Institutional Aspects
Economic power does not always convert to influence in international politics; however,
in the case of the BRICS, it is possible to see how these countries are being able to
transform their economic potential into political influence in some areas of international
governance. All the BRICS countries are currently members of relevant international
institutions, such as the UN, the World Trade Organization and the G20, being active
participants in their meetings and initiatives. In parallel, the BRICS have also been growing
their international influence as a pluralistic summit institution.
Thus, this section studies the institutional aspects of the BRICS in the international tax and
transfer pricing arena, analyzing its performance as a group and its interaction and
influence among new institutions and initiatives, namely the International Tax Dialogue,
the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes and the
G20125.
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3.4.1

The BRICS as a Group

The BRICS are a group of countries that seek to strengthen the relations of its members
among themselves and, at the same time, to exert an international influence on matters
where they have a common interest. In 2006, Brazil, Russia, India and China held – in
parallel to a UN General Assembly meeting in New York – their first meeting as the group
BRIC. Nevertheless, the group’s first joint document was only published after the First
Ministerial Meeting of the BRICs held in Russia in 2008. In this communiqué, the BRICs
representatives declared the need for a more democratic international system, including
through the expansion of the UN Security Council and incorporation of Brazil and India as
permanent members126. In this first communiqué, it is already possible to observe the
BRICs intention of transforming global governance in favour of a greater sharing in the
decision-making process of global matters.
In 2009, the BRICs had another meeting, in which the group’s main discussion was the
2008 financial crisis and its repercussions in the world economy. Although the crisis had
originated in developed countries, its effects were also suffered in a greater extent by poorer
nations127. For this reason, the BRICs reiterated the discussion during the G20 meeting in
April 2009, emphasizing the need for the international system to improve on: a) democratic
and

transparent

decision-making

in

international

financial

organizations;

b)

implementation of a more solid legal basis; c) compatibility between activities of national
regulatory institutions and international standards-setting bodies; and d) strengthening risk
management and supervisory practices128.
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In 2010, the BRICs meeting occurred in Brazil and the countries’ representatives continued
to address the 2008 economic crisis in their final communiqué, resonating the previous
year's discussion on the management and participation of emerging and developing nations
in the Bretton Woods institutions (The International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank)129. In 2011, in their annual meeting held in China, the BRICS were joined by South
Africa. In this meeting communiqué, the BRICS emphasized the need to coordinate their
multilateral agendas, both in economic matters as well as in the areas of international
security and human rights protection130.
In 2012, the BRICS annual meeting took place in India, where, essentially, all the
commitments made during the other meeting were reaffirmed131. The 2013 BRICS summit
was one of the most productive meetings of the group. The BRICS investigated the
feasibility of establishing a Development Bank focused on financing infrastructure projects
in emerging countries, with an initial quota of $ 100 billion USD. In this meeting, the
BRICS Development Banks signed the "Multilateral Agreement on Cooperation and Cofinancing for Sustainable Development" and the "Multilateral Agreement on Infrastructure
and Co-financing for Africa”132.
With respect to tax cooperation, in 2012, BRICS finance ministers and central bank
governors held a meeting in the United States, in which they agreed to develop a
cooperative approach on international taxation, transfer pricing, exchange of information,
tax evasion and tax avoidance matters133. This lead to a first meeting, occurred in 2013,
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between the BRICS heads of revenue, during which they deliberated on issues of common
concern regarding tax administration, international taxation, transfer pricing, cross-border
tax evasion and tax dispute mechanisms134. One of the identified areas of tax policy and tax
administration for extending the BRICS mutual cooperation was "contributing to the
“development of international standards on international taxation and transfer pricing
taking into account the aspirations of developing countries in general and BRICS countries
in particular”135. According to David Spencer, the choice of the words “international
standards on transfer pricing” was not coincidental, as the OECD claims that the ALP and
its guidelines are both the “international standard”136.
A multilateral cooperation approach was also deliberated in this meeting, as stated by the
BRICS heads of revenue in their 2013 communiqué:
We also agree to establish a central point of contact in each of the BRICS
Countries for coordination of issues relating to taxation. The central points
of contacts will identify issues of common interest in areas of International
Taxation and Transfer Pricing and will develop a common response,
interact and meet regularly, including pre-meeting before important
multilateral meetings.

The agreed common response of the BRICS

countries would be communicated to international organisations engaged in
development of standards on International Taxation and Transfer Pricing137.
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In 2015, the BRICS heads of revenue met again to discuss potential areas of cooperation
in reaching a “globally fair and modern tax system”138. In this regard, the BRICS
representatives welcomed the final package of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)
Action Plan measures, acknowledging transfer pricing as one of the areas of priority139.

3.4.1.1

The Debate Regarding the BRICS Performance as an
International Institution

There is a continuing discussion regarding the BRICS performance as a group, particularly
about how and why their summits occurred and have been developed. Some authors, such
as O’Neill, view the BRICS as a group with little importance to its countries or to the global
community in general140. This school of thought highlights the political and economic
differences141 among the countries and the lack of mutual interests as obstacles to achieving
some relevant developments, such as a reform in the UN Security Council, advocated by
the group in their 2008 summit142. In a similar sense, some authors have the understanding
that the BRICS are only one of the many groups of emerging economies that arose in the
last decades, with these other groups having more possibilities of providing better global
governance and influence because of their more reliable democratic political systems143.
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Other authors argue that, although the BRICS are increasingly becoming more influential,
they are still far from forming a “unified political alliance”144. Therefore, even though the
BRICS represent a challenge to many aspects of the current international system
“functionality, scope, legitimacy and authority”, the interests and differences between their
members impede that they effectively change the “structural power” of the existing
international order145.
A different position is adopted by Nikonov, who sees the BRICS as an expression of the
unified political will of these emerging countries to create a new international institutional
balance. For the author, the BRICS act as a developing and emerging country coalition that
tries to shift the existing balance of global political influence – which is undemocratic and
unipolar, failing to offer opportunities for all countries – from the West to the developing
world146. Identifying the BRICS similarities as large, emerging post-colonial powers as
well as the failure of the G7 in adequately accommodating their power and interests, this
school of thought understands the BRICS as competitors to the G8 and G20.
A more moderate view is taken by Kirton147 and Luckhurst148 who see the BRICS as a
cooperator with the international system and its leading industrialized states. Considering
the membership of all BRICS countries in the G20, these authors note the tendency of the
BRICS to voice their dissent positions in reasonable and diplomatic terms:
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Strategic, political, and economic differences between the BRICS make it
unlikely they will constitute an anti-western alliance and try to transform
inter- national economic norms, for example, by undermining the United
States and other wealthy states. Their preference for enhancing
multilateralism in international relations is not a radical new political–
economic agenda, but simply intended to gain leverage within existing
mechanisms. Increasing incorporation of the BRICS in key institutions and
forums such as the WTO, IMF, G20, and FSB indicates that their focus is
to become more influential through dialogue and cooperation, not
confrontation. Despite occasional evidence from Russia and Brazil that
contestation could increase, the Chinese government has consistently
prioritized multilateral cooperation and leadership through existing
institutions and practices in international and Asian regional contexts. This
is a consequence of their appreciation of the nonzero-sum effects of
complex interdependence, especially in relations with the United States149.

3.4.2

The International Tax Dialogue

The International Tax Dialogue (ITD) is an initiative of the European Commission, the
Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the OECD,
the World Bank and the Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations150. The ITD
organizes periodic global and regional conferences to discuss policy and administration
issues, aiming to encourage and facilitate the debate of tax matters among tax officials,
regional tax organizations, international organizations and other key stakeholders151.
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The ITD has held five global conferences to date, two of them being hosted in BRICS
countries152. Each of these global conferences were attended by senior representatives from
approximately 90 countries, having focused on matters such as “Tax and
Intergovernmental Relations”, “Tax and Inequality” and “Financial Institutions and
Instruments”153. This initiative, by promoting the strengthening of cooperation between tax
administrations at the global level, expands the opportunity to participate in the
international tax debate to more countries, including the BRICS. The ITD, therefore, is one
more forum where the BRICS countries can coordinate tax policies, share their best
practices and contribute to the development of information tools.

3.4.3

The Platform for Collaboration on Tax

The Platform for Collaboration on Tax (PCT) was launched in April 2016 as a joint effort
between the IMF, the OECD, the UN and the World Bank Group154. The members of the
PCT have regular meetings with representatives from developing countries, regional tax
organizations and banks155. The PCT aims to intensify the cooperation between these
international organizations on tax matters in order to better support governments in
addressing the challenges they face in the area of international taxation156. Therefore, the
Platform provides a framework for:
1. Producing concrete joint outputs and deliverables under an agreed work
plan, implemented in collaboration by all or selected IOs, and leveraging
each institution’s own work program and comparative advantage. The
outputs may cover a variety of domestic and international tax matters. 2.
Strengthening dynamic interactions between standard setting, capacity
building and technical assistance (experience and knowledge from capacity
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building work feeding into standard setting and vice-versa, including timing
of

implementation).

3.

Sharing

information

on

activities

more

systematically, including on country level activities157.
One of the main activities performed by the PCT is the development of appropriate tools
for developing countries regarding international tax matters, including those dealt under
the BEPS initiative158. Recognizing that the taxation of MNEs covers a number of issues,
which affect all countries, the PCT develops toolkits to assist developing countries to
address a set of these issues and to protect their tax bases.
In June 2017, the PCT published a toolkit in the area of transfer pricing named “Addressing
Difficulties in Accessing Comparables Data for Transfer Pricing Analyses”, which
specifically addresses how developing countries can overcome the lack of data necessary
to apply transfer pricing rules159.

3.4.4

The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of
Information

The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information (“The Global Forum”)
was formed in the early 2000s as an OECD initiative to address the obstacles to tax
compliance created by non-cooperative countries. Originally, the Global Forum members
were OECD countries and other countries that had agreed to implement transparency and
exchange of information measures. In 2009, the Global Forum was restructured and now
has 143 members – including all of the BRICS countries – on equal footing, being the
“premier international body for ensuring the implementation of transparency and exchange
of information in the tax area”160.
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According to F. Alfredo Prats, The Global Forum is an example of institution that
represents the new international tax order that is being developed. This new order is based
on two principles: a) effective taxation of cross-border income; and b) transparency and
cooperation (in order to enable the effective application of the previous principle). For the
author, the new international tax order relies on the cooperation of the whole international
community and, to achieve this, international consensus is essential161. It is in this context
that the BRICS may play an important role in helping to conciliate the tax policies and
demands of developed and developing countries to achieve global consensus on
international tax matters.

3.4.5

The G20

The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, or G20, is a forum
for international cooperation composed by 19 members from the 25 largest national
economies plus one member representing the European Union162. The current members of
the G20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union163. The G20 is a
pivotal group in the creation of cooperation mechanisms and international standards. Thus,
the development of international tax policies is one of the main issues in its political
agenda164.
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The political influence of the BRICS can be observed not only in the group’s increasing
institutionalization – developed throughout their annual summits – but also in their
participation in the G20 summits. The G20 provides an opportunity for the BRICS to “have
a leading role in addressing the issues and linking the legitimate demands of developed and
developing countries, while recognizing the position of economic drivers and operators”165.
China, for instance, has been acting as a cautious but always essential and effective global
leader in G20 governance, advocating for incremental reforms rather than a radical
replacement of the existing institutionalized system and operating in co-leadership with
other members, especially the BRICS166.
Notwithstanding their influential positions as individual countries, according to Kristen
Hopewell167 and Stefan Schrim168, the BRICS countries have not coherently acted together
to create and drive a BRICS agenda in global governance in the context of the G20.
However, when there are common interests, the BRICS have a record of coordination, such
as when they had a uniform position opposing the bank taxes proposed by the IMF in the
2010 G20 meeting169. Their participation in the G20, therefore, may be an indication of the
group’s choice to operate “inside the system as a loosely coordinated bargaining group”170,
focusing on their common interests and, more regularly, on particular interests of the
individual BRICS countries and not counterbalancing current dominant countries and
institutions.

3.5

Conclusion

This chapter explored the economic, legal and institutional aspects involved in the
establishment of the BRICS as an association between fast-growing emerging countries.
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The reason for grouping the BRICS countries is not obvious, as their policies and politics
diverge; they are not geographically close; their economies do not necessarily supplement
each other; and some of their interests diverge. However, they are all large emerging
economies who share economic and politic concerns, one of them being the dominance of
Western powers over the international tax agenda. This dominance is reflected, in the area
of transfer pricing, in the OECD’s perceived authority in developing international transfer
pricing standards, such as the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, as discussed in Chapter
2. Thus, the next chapter will analyze the transfer pricing rules of the BRICS countries and
how they differ from the standard approach established by the OECD and from each other.
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Chapter 4

4

Transfer Pricing Rules in the BRICS Countries

Establishing a suitable regulation for transfer pricing issues is extremely important for the
BRICS countries as the manipulation of prices by MNEs can be an even more damaging
problem for developing and emerging economies171. In this sense, considering that the
BRICS have developed their international tax policies “with an eye to the approach
suggested by the OECD, but not necessarily in conformity with its structures”172, this
chapter discuss the transfer pricing regulations of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa. Each of these countries is analyzed in a separate section, comprehending the
historical development of their transfer pricing rules, their current transfer pricing law as
well as peculiarities and challenges they face in its application.

4.1 Brazil
The legal treatment of transfer pricing in Brazil is a highly complex and relatively
new matter which, although demonstrating the concern of adapting itself to the
international scenario, has departed significantly from it, giving excessive attention
to the preservation of the national tax base, although in disagreement with the
arm’s length principle itself and with the international parameters173.

4.1.1

Introduction

Brazilian transfer pricing legislation was only enacted in 1996, following an important
legal reform that moved Brazil’s tax system from a territorial system to taxing MNE’s
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worldwide income, according to a residence-based taxation. The country has received
substantial amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the past years and it is considered
– as other developing and emerging economies – a capital importing country, since its
inward FDI stocks exceed its outward FDI stocks174. In this context, considering the
increasing importance of foreign income to the Brazilian economy, the development of
Brazil’s transfer pricing rules was an important stage in preventing the allocation of taxable
income abroad. The country’s transfer pricing peculiarity, nonetheless, is that Brazilian
rules were established with significant deviations from the international standards
implemented by the OECD’s member countries.
The objective of this section is to review some aspects of the Brazilian transfer pricing
regime and to demonstrate how some positions deviating from the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines are commonly found in Brazil’s transfer pricing law. This section is structured
as follows: a) historical background and the development of transfer pricing rules in Brazil;
b) transfer pricing regulations in Brazil, in which Brazilian transfer pricing methods for
import and export transactions will be analyzed; and c) peculiarities and challenges in
Brazil’s transfer pricing practices, in which the use of predetermined margins, locationspecific advantages and intangible regulations in the country will be reviewed.

4.1.2

Historical Background: The development of Transfer Pricing
Rules in Brazil

Until 1995, Brazil adopted a territorial approach175 regarding the taxation of MNEs,
according to which only income earned from sources located inside its territory could be
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taxed, excluding any foreign income earned by an enterprise – either directly by performing
activities abroad or indirectly through associated enterprises – from liability for Brazilian
tax176. However, because of the increasing importance of foreign income to the Brazilian
economy and to its tax system, in December 1995, Brazil moved to the worldwide taxation
of MNEs income with the promulgation of Law no. 9,249, which established the
requirement to include profits, income and capital gains earned abroad in the Brazilian tax
basis177. Thus, Brazil changed its previous position and began to tax not only the income
produced inside its territory but also the income produced abroad by resident enterprises.
Following this change in its tax system, Brazil enacted its first transfer pricing legislation
(Law no. 9,430)178 in 1996. Until 1996, the manipulation of prices in transactions between
related persons was regulated in Articles 72 and 73 of Law no. 4,506, promulgated in
1964179. According to Article 72, transactions could be considered ‘disguised distribution
of profits’ when they involved the sale or acquisition of goods in the domestic market for
a notoriously lower or above market value, meaning that the enterprise was acting in the
interest of the other related party rather than according to its own interest180. In these cases,
unless the taxpayer proved that the business was carried out in the interest of the enterprise
and under the same conditions in which the enterprise would contract with third parties, a
50% tax rate was applied by Brazilian tax authorities181. Although it could be possible to
argue that Law 4,506 was enough to prevent international transfer pricing schemes, in
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practice, these rules were never substantially applied by Brazilian tax authorities in the
context of international transactions between related companies182.
While Brazil did not develop specific transfer pricing legislation until 1996, the country’s
double taxation agreement network183 reproduced the provision contained in paragraph 1
of Article 9 of the OECD and UN Model Conventions. Article 9 established the possibility
of an adjustment in the transfer prices of transactions between related companies resident
in the contracting countries, according to the arm's length standard. Nonetheless, this treaty
provision – even with the domestic regulation regarding ‘disguised distribution of profits’
– was not considered to be applicable by Brazilian tax authorities without the existence of
an internal transfer pricing law that expressly authorized any adjustments. Another relevant
aspect regarding Brazilian double taxation agreements is that the country, without
exception, did not include the provision contained in paragraph 2 of Article 9, i.e., the
country did not commit itself to the obligation of granting the correlative adjustment,
revealing the apparent disregard of Brazil for economic double taxation184.
It was against this background that Law 9,430 introduced a more decisive and precise
control regarding international transfer pricing in Brazil. The enactment of the Brazilian
transfer pricing legislation aimed to avoid the manipulation of prices by MNEs on imports
and exports between associated companies and the consequent allocation of taxable income
abroad185. Hence, while the OECD’s transfer pricing rules have the goal of identifying the
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price that would have been agreed between independent enterprises186, Brazilian rules were
introduced as mechanisms to control and combat tax avoidance schemes187, which explains
why the transfer pricing legislation in Brazil determines a maximum price for deductible
expenses on imports and a minimum profit rate on exports in transactions between
associated enterprises188, as will be discussed below.

4.1.3

Transfer Pricing Rules in Brazil

Transfer pricing is currently regulated in Brazil by Law 9,430 – recently updated by Law
12,715/2012189 – and other administrative regulations issued by the Brazilian Federal
Revenue Office (BFRO)190, among which, one of the most significant regulations is
Normative Instruction no. 243/02191. Aiming to deal with tax avoidance through transfer
pricing arrangements, these provisions cover transactions between “associated persons”,
transactions between a Brazilian resident and corporations or individuals resident in lowtax jurisdictions (countries with no income taxes or with income tax rates lower than
20%)192 and preferential tax regime’s transactions193, irrespective of whether the two parties
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qualify as associated enterprises. According to the Brazilian rules, specifically in Articles
18 and 19 of Law no. 9,430, the association between parties acts as an absolute presumption
of the transfer price’s manipulation194, i.e., there is an assumption that all intra-group
transactions necessarily attribute unreal prices for its goods as a way of shifting profits to
other jurisdictions. This assumption goes against OECD’s Guidelines understanding,
according to which “tax administrations should not automatically assume that associated
enterprises have sought to manipulate their profits”195.
Regarding the transactions covered by Brazilian transfer pricing rules, Law no. 9.430 is
applied to goods, services and rights, imported or exported196. The idea is to establish a
generic definition able to encompass all transactions carried out between related enterprises
that involve the payment of a price as compensation for the advantage obtained with the
acquisition of ownership of a good, a service or the enjoyment of a right. In this context,
goods include tangible and intangible property; services include those provided between
related parties (intra-group) and those established in cost-sharing contracts; and rights
include different rights to use other parties’ properties, which entail different forms of
remuneration, such as rents, interest and premiums. Although similar to the international
standards, the scope of transactions controlled by Brazilian law has one important
peculiarity: transactions involving royalty payments and technology transfers to a foreign
country are expressly excluded from transfer pricing rules197.
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Despite following the ALP198 and the elementary methodology suggested by the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines – Brazil has 32 income tax treaties currently in force and all
of them reiterate Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty’s dispositions – Brazilian transfer
pricing rules deviate from OECD’s conventional methods, which are primarily based on
comparison, and adopt predetermined profit margins199. In this context, it is possible to
observe that the Brazilian transfer pricing law created a legal fiction, according to which,
if the “price practiced”200 is higher on imports or lower on exports than the “parameter
price”201, the first must be adjusted in accordance to the latter202. In other words, the transfer
pricing law establishes limits of maximum prices for import transactions and minimum
prices for export transactions203.
Therefore, there are two main aspects in which Brazilian transfer pricing law departs from
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. First, Brazil subjects to a unitary regulation crossborder transactions between related enterprises – exclusive object of most international
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transfer pricing regulations – and cross-border transactions between independent
enterprises when one of them is located in countries of favored taxation204. The other
divergence is that, while the transfer pricing policy adopted on the basis of the OECD
recommendations and the US experience is not based on a presumption of artificiality of
prices between related enterprises, Brazilian law establishes the automatic prevalence of
the "parameter price" – calculated by legally predetermined methods – regardless of an
administrative investigation of the case205.

4.1.3.1

Brazilian Transfer Pricing Methods

As mentioned, "parameter price" is an idea created by Brazilian transfer pricing law to
indicate the appropriate transfer price – determined by the methods provided in Law 9,430
– which must be compared with the "practiced price" effectively carried out in controlled
transactions during the tax assessment period. The methods provided in Law 9,430 were
allegedly inspired by the traditional methods to determine the arm's length price employed
in the international discipline of transfer pricing. However, while the focus of traditional
international methods is on price comparability (CUP method) or gross margins (cost plus
and resale price methods), in Brazil, the comparability is maintained only for CUP-inspired
methods. As for the methods inspired by cost plus and resale price, the Brazilian legislator
innovated by predetermining the gross margins that should be applied.
Regarding the application of the CUP method, the procedures are similar to the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines; however, in regards to the cost plus and the resale price
methods, Brazilian law establishes fixed margins for gross profit and mark-up instead of
finding and using comparable transactions206. In addition, although the approach introduced
by Brazilian transfer pricing law encompasses procedures inspired in traditional transaction
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methods (CUP, cost plus and resale price methods), it does not prescribe the use of
transactional profit methods (profit split and transactional net margin methods)207.
Brazilian law has designated the methods differently depending on whether they apply to
import or export operations208. Accordingly, the transfer pricing methods established by the
Brazilian law, as well as their corresponding international methods, are analyzed separately
below.

4.1.3.1.1

Transfer Pricing Methods for Import Transactions

Brazilian transfer pricing law provides four methods for establishing the price limit for
products, services or rights imported by Brazilian resident enterprises.
Inspired by the CUP method, Article 18, Item I of Law no. 9,430 establishes the
“Independent Compared Prices” method (Preços Independentes Comparados - PIC),
according to which the “transfer price is based on the average price of identical or similar
products or services in purchase and sale transactions carried out in either the internal or
external market under similar payment conditions”209.
The “Resale Price Less Margin” method (Preço de Revenda Menos Lucro – PRL),
established in Article 18, Item II of Law 9,430 and inspired by the resale price method,
prescribes the determination of the transfer price according to the average resale price of
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goods, services or rights applied by the importer in transactions with independent parties,
less unconditional discounts, taxes, brokerage fees and profit margins210. These profit
margins are determined in Article 18, para 12 (recently updated by Law no. 12,725 of
2012)211 and calculated in accordance with the enterprise’s industrial sector:
Article 18, Paragraph 12: The margins referred to in item “d” of section II
shall be applied according to the sector of economic activity of the Brazilian
legal entity subject to transfer price controls and shall be subject, regardless
of having a productive process in Brazil or not, in the following percentages:
I - 40% for the sectors of: A) pharma-chemical and pharmaceutical
products;

B)

tobacco

products;

C)

optical,

photographic

and

cinematographic equipment and instruments; D) machines, apparatus and
equipment for medical and hospital dental use; E) extraction of oil and
natural gas; and F) petroleum products; II - 30% for the sectors of: A)
chemical products; B) glass and glass products; C) pulp, paper and paper
products; and D) metallurgy; and III - 20% for the other sectors212.
The third transfer pricing method for import transactions, according to Article 18, Item III
of Law 9,430, is the “Production Cost Plus Margin” (Custo de Produção Mais Lucro CPL). As well as its international correspondent method – the cost plus method – this
Brazilian procedure bases the transfer price on the average of production cost of identical
or similar products, services or rights in the jurisdiction where they were originally
produced, increased by taxes paid in such jurisdiction and by a profit margin. The
particularity is that, unlike the traditional (non-predetermined) cost plus method, the
Brazilian law establishes a fixed profit margin of 20% rather than determining it based on
comparables 213 .
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Finally, Law 12,715 introduced in 2012 the “Quote Price for Imports” method (Preço sob
Cotação da Importação – PCI), which is mandatorily applicable to import transactions of
commodities between related companies. In these cases, Brazilian law determines that the
benchmark is the average price of the daily medium quotes of the commodities negotiated
in internationally known commodities and future exchanges, adjusted by applicable
premiums and other variables. In cases where there is an absence of a trading pricing in
commodities and future exchanges, it is permissible to compare prices to those obtained
from independent data sources provided by internationally known research institutes. The
goal of this new method is to avoid discussions regarding the comparability of transactions
between related parties when there is a defined market that sets the price internationally,
as it is the case of commodities214.
A transfer pricing adjustment is required whenever the “practiced price”, i.e., the average
price paid by the Brazilian importer, exceeds the “parameter price”, i.e., the average price
determined under transfer pricing methods for import transactions215. Nevertheless, if the
practiced price paid by the Brazilian importer is less than the parameter price, no tax
adjustment is necessary.

4.1.3.1.2

Transfer Pricing Methods for Export Transactions

Regarding export transactions, Brazilian transfer pricing rules determine that, whenever
the average sales price of goods, services or rights exported by a Brazilian company in a
taxable year corresponds to less than 90% of the average price of the same goods, services
or rights sold in the domestic market, the price of the export transactions shall be defined
under one of the five methods established by Brazilian law216, which are detailed below.
The “Comparable Uncontrolled Price for Export Transactions” (Preço de Venda nas
Exportações – PVEs), described in Article 19, Paragraph 3, Item I of Law 9,430 and based
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Valadão, supra note 197 at 276.
As a consequence of the transfer price adjustment, the excess amount paid will be added to the
taxable base of the importer. Miyake and Tonanni, supra note 186.
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on the CUP method, establishes the transfer price according to the average price of identical
or similar goods, services or rights exported by a Brazilian company to foreign independent
parties, under similar payment conditions217.
Inspired by the resale price method, Brazilian transfer pricing rules created two methods
with the application of fixed profit margins: the “Wholesale Price in the Country of
Destination Less Profit Margin” method (Preço de Venda por Atacado no País de Destino
Diminuído de Lucro – PVA) and the “Retail Price in the Country of Destination Less Profit
Margin” method (Preço de Venda a Varejo no País de Destino Diminuído do Lucro –
PVV), described in Article 19, Paragraph 3, Items II and III of Law 9,430 as follows:
Article 19. Paragraph 3, Item II: Wholesale Price in the Country of
Destination Less Profit Margin Method: defined as the average of the selling
prices of identical or similar goods in the wholesale market of the country
of destination, under similar payment terms, reduced from the taxes
included in the price, charged in that country, and a profit margin of fifteen
percent on the wholesale price;
Article 19. Paragraph 3, Item III: Retail Price in the Country of Destination
Less Profit Margin: defined as the average of the selling prices of identical
or similar goods in the retail market of the country of destination, under
similar payment terms, less the taxes included in the price, charged in that
country, and a profit margin of thirty percent on the retail sale price218.
The “Acquisition or Production Cost Plus Taxes and Profit Margin” method (Custo de
Aquisição ou de Produção Mais Tributos e Lucro – CAP) is based on the cost plus method
and establishes the transfer price of a transactions based on the average acquisition or
production costs of the exported products, services or rights, increased by taxes and with a
15% profit margin, calculated on costs and taxes219.
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219
Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 19, Para 3, Item IV.
218

57

As well as in the Brazilian transfer pricing rules for import transactions, Law 12,715 has
also introduced a “Quota Price” method (Preço sob Cotação da Exportação – PECEX) for
export transactions. This method is applied in transactions of commodities between related
enterprises and its benchmark is the average price of the daily medium quotes of
commodities negotiated in internationally known commodities and future exchanges,
adjusted by the applicable premiums and other variables. In cases of absence of a trading
price in commodities and future exchanges, prices can be compared to those obtained from
independent data sources provided by internationally known research institutes.
Regardless of the method adopted220, if the average price applied by the Brazilian enterprise
in its export transactions (“the actual price”) exceeds the average price obtained under the
above-mentioned methods (“the parameter price”), no adjustment is required. When the
actual price is lower than the parameter price, Brazilian tax authorities are entitled to
perform a transfer pricing adjustment and to add the difference in the price to the taxable
base221.

4.1.4
4.1.4.1

Peculiarities and Challenges in Brazil’s Transfer Pricing
Practices
The Use of Predetermined Margins and the Arm’s Length
Principle: A Practical Approach Regarding the Lack of
Comparables and the Complexity Present in the OECD
Methodology

As mentioned above, the idea of a comparability analysis – present in all methods
developed at the international level – was only maintained in Brazil for CUP inspired
methods: the “Independent Compared Prices” (PIC)222, the “Comparable Uncontrolled
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If more than one method can be applied, Brazilian Law allows the taxpayer to adopt the method
which will result in the lower export price. Miyake and Tonanni, supra note 186.
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Ibid.
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According to the PIC method, comparable prices should be sought in transactions involving
goods, services or rights, identical or similar, made in the Brazilian or other markets under similar
payment terms. Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 18, Item I.
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Price for Export Transactions” (PVE)223, the “Quota Price for Imports” (PCI) and the
“Quota Price for Exports” (PECEX) methods. As for other transfer pricing methods, there
is a departure from the international comparability approach as a consequence of the
Brazilian legislator’s preference for the predetermination of profit margins in fixed
percentage values224. The following table describes the Brazilian transfer pricing rules in
comparison with the international methods, particularly those provided in the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and in the UN Practical Manual:
Table 1 - Brazilian Transfer Pricing Methods and its International Correspondents
BRAZILIAN TRANSFER PRICING METHODS
Import Transactions
Independent Compared
Prices (PIC)
Quota Price for Imports
(PCI)

Resale Price Less Margin
(PRL)
20% and other margins

223

Export Transactions
Comparable Uncontrolled
Price for Export Transactions
(PVE)
Quota Price for Exports
(PECEX)
Wholesale Price in the
Country of Destination Less
Profit Margin (PVA)
15% margins
Retail Price in the Country of
Destination Less Profit Margin
(PVV)
30% margins

INTERNATIONAL
CORRESPONDENT
METHODS (OECD TP
GUIDELINES AND UN TP
MANUAL)

Comparable Uncontrolled
Price (CUP)

Resale Price Method

In the PVE method, comparable prices should be sought in transactions involving goods,
services or rights, identical or similar, made by the company itself to other customers or by another
domestic exporter, during the same period and under similar payment terms. Law 9,430, Brazil
1996, Article 19, Para 3, Item I.
224
As explained by Marcos Aurélio Pereira Valadão (Brazilian Member of the UN Committee of
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters), “the methodology introduced by the law
listed the traditional transaction methods (Cost Plus Method and Resale Price Method) but denied
the use of transactional profit methods (the Profit Split Method and Transactional Net Margin
Method) and formulary apportionment. Regarding the CUP Method, for export or imports, the law
introduced a methodology that is similar to OECD practices. However, with regard to the Cost Plus
Method and Resale Price Method, instead of making use of comparable transactions, the law
established fixed margins for gross profits and mark-up”. UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 358.

59

Production Cost Plus Margin
(CPL)
20% margins

Acquisition or Production Cost
Plus Taxes and Profit Margin
(CAP)
15% margins
N/A

Cost Plus Method
Transactional Net Margin
Method (TNMM)
Profit Split Method

The use of predetermined margins in the Brazilian transfer pricing legislation is considered
to be a simplified methodology regarding the application of the ALP225 because such
margins substitute the numbers that would be found through the comparability analysis
employed in the OECD approach226. Since the determination of the profits and margins that
independent parties would have in similar transactions is one of the main difficulties of the
ALP227, the Brazilian solution of establishing predetermined margins seems to have
recognized that it would not be possible to acquire this information from either taxpayers
or tax authorities228.
In this context, it is possible to maintain that the adoption of predetermined margins
represents a “compromise between the arm’s length standard and practicability”, especially
because the use of such margins is not mandatory229. Indeed, in order to lessen Brazilian
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Although the Brazilian rules may resemble the formulary apportionment system – particularly
because of the use of formulas based on predetermined profit and mark up margins – it is important
to elucidate that “the Brazilian methodology is indeed a simplification of the traditional transaction
methods, and the worldwide unitary taxation are more like a transactional profit split method. Brazil
does not adopt transactional profit methods”. Valadão, supra note 197 at 282.
226
Ibid.
227
The determination of profits and margins in these cases require extremely complex calculations,
extensive market research and considerable market information, which is not always available at
reasonable costs. Schoueri, “Brazil” supra note 168 at 63.
228
Indeed, due to a large number of taxpayers and a relatively modest tax administration,
practicality seems to be one of the motors of the Brazilian transfer pricing system. One example is
that, because of the complexities of the regular tax system, almost 90% of taxpayers choose to
apply a simplified taxation approach, in which the taxable profit is established through the
application of predetermined margins to the gross income of the taxpayer, without allowing
deductions. Schoueri, “Brazil” supra note 168 at 78-79.
229
Schoueri, “Brazil” supra note 168 at 63. In the same sense, Marcos Valadão also understands
that the Brazilian methodology is a simplification of the traditional arm’s length approach, mainly
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transfer pricing rules departure from the ALP230, the legislator created a procedure for
changing the predetermined margins in Article 20 and Article 21, Paragraph 2 of Law
9,430, as it follows:
Art. 20. In special circumstances, the Minister of Finance may change the
percentages referred to in Articles 18 and 19, and Items II, III and IV of
Paragraph 3.
Art. 21. [...] Paragraph 2. Margins of profit other than those established in
Articles 18 and 19 may be admitted, provided that the taxpayer proves them,
based on publications, surveys or reports prepared in accordance with the
provisions of this article231.
Some authors have raised severe criticisms concerning the Brazilian system in the presence
of so many rules that move the Brazilian transfer pricing law away from the ALP as
established by the OECD Guidelines.. In this regard, Paulo Ayres Barreto understands that
"the distance between transfer pricing discipline in Brazil and the regime adopted by the
OECD member countries is abysmal", concluding that "there was no incorporation [in the
Brazilian legal system] of the arm's length standard with the content attributed to it in
Comparative Law"232. Another Brazilian author, Ricardo Mariz de Oliveira, argues that
Law 9,430 did not fully adopt the ALP because the Brazilian legislator "wanted to

because of the use of fixed margins for the resale price and cost plus methods. Valadão, supra note
197 at 271.
230
If taxpayers were not allowed to demonstrate that independent parties have different profit
margins in similar conditions, Brazilian predetermined margins would assume an absolute and
mandatory nature, which could lead to arbitrary parameter prices unrelated to the market reality.
Therefore, considering that taxpayers are allowed to demonstrate that unrelated enterprises have
different margins than those established in the law, it is possible to conclude that Brazilian transfer
pricing rules meet the requirements of the arm’s length principle and practicability as well.
Schoueri, “Brazil” supra note 168 at 64.
231
Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 20 and Article 21, Para 2.
232
Paulo Ayres Barreto, Imposto sobre a Renda e Preços de Transferência (São Paulo: Dialética,
2001) 153.

61

introduce and introduced much stricter rules, closed in their own criteria"233. This
perception has been internationally supported as well: analyzing Law no. 9,430 after its
promulgation, Alejandro Messineo affirmed that there was no general ALP on which
Brazilian transfer pricing rules were based. According to the author, Brazilian rules seemed
more like a minimum guarantee of revenue and its application would probably result in
conflicts with the OECD and the US transfer pricing provisions234.
The above-mentioned positions are quite insistent in sustaining that Brazilian rules do not
completely embody the ALP. These opinions, nevertheless, are not fully accepted by other
authors, who recognize practicality as an important element to be considered in establishing
a transfer pricing regime. In this context, Alberto Xavier explains that, although the
Brazilian methodology can lead to distinct results than the ALP, its characteristics bring
more comfort to the taxpayer than the legal insecurity caused by the international
methodology235. Similarly, Paulo Bento acknowledges that whereas "there is a clear
detriment to the consistency of price determination based on the arm's length standard",
Brazilian rules allow for "a greater degree of simplicity and certainty in relation to OECD
rules"236.
The understanding that Brazilian rules are compatible with the ALP is also shared by
administrative courts237 in Brazil, according to two important administrative decisions. In
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Ricardo Mariz de Oliveira, Fundamentos do Imposto de Renda (São Paulo: Quartier Latin, 2008)
843.
234
Alejandro Messineo, “Transfer Pricing in Latin America: New Rules in Mexico and Brazil”
(1997) International Transfer Pricing Journal 47.
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Xavier, supra note 164 at 390.
236
The author adds that “the difficulties involved in determining prices based on the arm's length
standard, associated with the Brazilian reality of information scarcity in the public domain and lack
of resources for the fiscal authorities, lead us to the realization that a system as the one adopted by
the OECD, does not seem feasible in Brazil”. Paulo Bento, “As Regras Brasileiras de Preços de
Transferência e o Princípio — Arm’s Length – Uma Análise Multidisciplinar” (2006) 2 Revista de
Direito Tributário Internacional 103 at 129.
237
Judicial courts have not been involved in transfer pricing decisions because most cases resulted
from administrative procedures conducted by Brazilian tax authorities in which the result was a
notice of tax assessment. Therefore, according to the Brazilian administrative procedure, the
taxpayer is allowed to present a defence to this notice of assessment, which is judged by an
administrative judge. This administrative judge’s decision can be reviewed by the Administrative
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the first case, regarding a Taxpayer Consultation Procedure in 2001, the administrative
court ruled that there is no contradiction between Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty –
which covers transfer pricing procedures – and Articles 18 to 24 of Law no. 9,430 – which
introduced transfer pricing rules into Brazilian domestic law238. The second case was
presented in 2005 and involved enterprises resident in Brazil and Germany and questioned
the relationship between Article 9 of the Brazil-Germany double taxation agreement and
the transfer pricing methods established in the Brazilian domestic law. In this circumstance,
the Administrative Taxpayer’s Council decided that “although the Brazilian law’s option
for specific closed methods allows, in some cases, that the arm’s length price is not
achieved, there is no conflict between Article 9 of the double taxation agreement with
Germany and the domestic legislation”239, i.e., Brazilian law did not oppose the ALP but
rather adapted its methodology and application to the Brazilian tax system.

4.1.4.2

Location-Specific Advantages

As a developing country with an emerging economy, Brazil offers location-specific market
features and factors of production that enable MNEs to achieve a superior financial
outcome from the provision of the same product or service in comparison with alternative
locations240. These location-specific advantages (LSAs) can include access to skilled labor,
incentives, market premium, access to growing markets and cost savings241.

Taxpayer’s Council. If not satisfied with this decision, the taxpayer can further appeal to the
Superior Chamber of Tax Appeals and, after this instance, it is possible to appeal to judicial courts.
Most of the transfer pricing cases, in practice, are decided in the administrative courts because it
has lower costs to taxpayers and a final decision can be reached in a shorter period of time. Calich
and Rolim, supra note 163 at 531-532.
238
Coordenação-Geral de Tributação da Secretaria da Receita Federal do Brasil, 21 September
2000 (2000) Diário Oficial da União (Brazil).
239
Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais (2005) No. 16327.001319/2001-17, Diário Oficial
da União (Brazil).
240
Brazil not only offers low cost manufacturing opportunities to MNEs but it also provides market
access to an expanding middle class that is willing to pay a premium price for foreign products.
Richard Ainsworth, “Transfer Pricing: UN Guidelines Brazil” (2013) Boston University School of
Law Working Paper No. 13-48 at 1.
241
Although location advantages and location savings are generally common to MNE’s operations
in developing countries, in practice, according to the typical transfer pricing methods, the location
advantages are allocated associated enterprises in developed countries. Martjin Lange and Paul

63

According to the ALP – whose main goal is determining which conditions would be agreed
between independent parties in comparable transactions – LSAs are only taken into account
insofar as independent enterprises would consider them when negotiating and determining
the prices of their transactions242. Under the Brazilian transfer pricing system, on the other
hand, the predetermined profit margins may cause the transfer of the value of the LSAs out
of Brazil through the transfer price. This happens because, as the fixed margin method is
applied regardless of the cost structures of taxpayers, enterprises with low operating costs
face lower tax burdens than identical enterprises with high operating costs243. Indeed, this
is one of the main weaknesses of the predetermined profit margins approach used by Brazil:
the fact that some enterprises may be taxed at profit margins – could be higher or lower –
that are not compatible with their real profitability244.

4.1.4.3

Intangibles

Because of the difficulties in applying the traditional transfer pricing methods to intangible
properties, Brazilian law provides special rules on royalties and technical assistance paid
to foreign related persons245. As mentioned before, Brazil’s transfer pricing law expressly
excluded royalties for the use of patents, trademarks and know-how as well as
remuneration for technical, scientific or administrative assistance paid by a Brazilian
enterprise to foreign related persons from its scope246. The applicable law for these

Lankhorst, “The Impact of Location Advantages on the Transfer Pricing of Multinationals: On the
Chinese Love for European Designer Handbags and Lower Production Costs in India” (2014)
International Transfer Pricing Journal 223 at 224.
242
Ibid.
243
UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 371.
244
Ibid.
245
Before 2013, cross-border intercompany loans that were registered with the Central Bank of
Brazil were not subject to the limitations of Law 9,430, i.e., there were no limits in the interest
deductions under the transfer pricing system. However, with the promulgation of Law 12,715 in
2012, cross-border loan transactions contracted with related persons, or with persons located in
low-tax jurisdictions or privileged tax regimes are now subject to limitations regarding the interest
deduction. Miyake and Tonanni, supra note 186.
246
“Article 18. Para 9. The provisions of this article do not apply to cases of royalties and technical,
scientific, administrative or similar assistance, which remain subject to the conditions of
deductibility contained in the current legislation”. Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 18, Para 9.
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transactions (Income Tax Regulations – Article 355) establishes that only a fixed
percentage – determined by the Brazilian Ministry of Finance – can be deducted as
expenses for income tax. In relation to royalties, for instance, the percentage is 5% of the
related revenue, regardless of the nature of the transaction in analysis247.
Royalties and technical assistance payments received by a Brazilian enterprise from a
foreign related party, on the other hand, are not mentioned in Brazil’s transfer pricing
regulations. Thus, this foreign-source income is subject to the Brazilian transfer pricing
rules for export transactions.

4.1.5

Conclusion

There is a significant gap between Brazilian domestic transfer pricing law and the
international transfer pricing standards, particularly those established by the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the UN Practical Manual. One of the main reasons for this
dissimilarity is that, while the OECD transfer pricing approach aims to identify the arm’s
length price, Brazilian rules, as it is possible to observe from their development process,
have the goal of combating schemes of tax avoidance involving the use of transfer prices248.
The Brazilian concern with tax avoidance explains why the country chooses to establish
parameters that determine maximum margins for deductible expenses on imports and
minimum margins on export transactions.
The Brazilian system of predetermined margins focuses on simplicity and practicality as it
avoids the need for specific comparables, which is one of the main challenges in the
application of the ALP, particularly for developing countries. Indeed, according to the
international standards, the application of traditional transfer pricing methods requires the
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“Article 355. Sums of royalties related to the exploitation of patents for invention or use of
industrial or trademarks and for technical, scientific, administrative or similar assistance may be
deducted as operating expenses up to a maximum of 5% of net sales revenue from product
manufactured or sold”. Income Tax Regulations, Brazil 1999, Article 355.
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obtainability of precise and detailed data to empirically establish the gross profit margin of
independent enterprises and this type of information is not always available for taxpayers
or tax authorities. In this context, it can be argued that the Brazilian system also “stabilized
the expectation of taxpayers with respect to their Brazilian tax liability associated with
inter-company transactions”249, applying the same methodology for all enterprises. Because
of its emphasis on practicability, transfer pricing law in Brazil developed a system with
low compliance costs to taxpayers and to the tax administration as well, liberating the
country’s scarce human resources to work on other relevant issues.
One of the Brazilian transfer pricing system’s main disadvantages is that some enterprises
are taxed at different profit margins – higher or lower – than their real profitability250.
Because the fixed margin method is applied irrespective of the taxpayers’ costs, some
relevant concepts such as location savings and market premium, present in the Brazilian
economy, may be disregarded by the transfer pricing rules. Besides that, the Brazilian
approach can cause economic double taxation251 in cases where there is no access to
authorities to negotiate the relief of double taxation, especially considering that Brazil has
reservations in its double taxation agreements on clauses to resolve double taxation
situations derived from transfer pricing adjustments.
In general, it is possible to observe that Brazilian transfer pricing rules diverge from
relevant aspects of transfer pricing control existent in the international standards. In this
sense, it is important to note that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, although
authoritative, are not binding in OECD member countries252. For this reason, it is
permissible for a non-member country, such as Brazil, to develop a transfer pricing regime

249
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that is quite dissimilar from the international norm. Therefore, although the country, i.e.,
Brazil, must consider whether it is worth disregarding all the knowledge accumulated over
many years of transfer pricing studies within the OECD, care should be taken in simply
transposing international recommendations into its domestic legislation.

4.2

Russia

The Russian transfer pricing rules and the Russian tax system continue to
evolve in response to the increasing integration of Russia into the world
economy. (…) It can be expected that the Russian approach will continue to
evolve in the future closer to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
However, the practical implementation will still likely have distinct features
of the Russia legal system, and is unlikely to be 100 per cent identical to the
approaches suggested by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines253.

4.2.1

Introduction

The fall of communism in Russia completely transformed the country’s economic and
business environment. With the exposure of Russia to the forces of globalization,
predetermined regulated prices were replace by free market reforms, foreign trade was
opened up and no longer monopolized by the government and a modern tax system was
introduced in the country254.
In this context, transfer pricing assumed a greater importance, the first rules being enacted
in 1991, which were replaced by a new transfer pricing law in 2012. This new law
represented an attempt to bring Russian transfer pricing rules closer to the OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines, introducing the ALP – modeled after Article 9 of the OECD Model
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Treaty – into Russian tax law. At that time, Russia was negotiating to become a member
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and of the OECD255, and compliance with
international transfer pricing standards was an important aspect in its accession
negotiations, especially with the latter256.
At present, transfer pricing is one of the most popular topics among tax specialists in
Russia, especially considering the major relevance of commodities for the Russian
economy257. This section covers the following topics: a) historical background of transfer
pricing rules in the Russian Federation; b) current transfer pricing rules in Russia; and c)
peculiarities and challenges in Russian transfer pricing practice.

4.2.2

Historical Background: The Development of Transfer Pricing
Rules in the Russian Federation

Until 1991, when Russia – as part of the Soviet Union – was still a socialist economy, the
manipulation of transfer prices was not a concern because, in the Soviet system, prices
were controlled by the government and, furthermore, the public finance system was
developed to centralize and redistribute all the profits that were not immediately necessary
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for the enterprise258. This apparent irrelevance of transfer pricing in the Russian Federation
changed with the fall of communism in 1991 and the consequent adoption of a free market
economy. Therefore, in December 1991, a Western-inspired tax system was established in
Russia, which, among other provisions, introduced in Article 4(1) the possibility to adjust
the tax base of companies based on market prices259. According to this provision, taxpayers
selling products or performing services at prices below cost had to calculate the VAT tax
based on the market prices for similar transactions, but never less than the actual cost260.
One problem with these transfer pricing rules was that they were usually applied without
considering the actual circumstances of a transaction, not distinguishing between taxpayers
who were manipulating transfer prices for tax purposes and those who, acting in good faith,
had to sell below costs because of a damaging market situation261. Moreover, tax experts
argue that the 1991 Russian tax system as a whole was not efficient, having a great number
of isolated laws as well as ambiguous and conflicting provisions262. For this reason, in 1999,
the Russian Federation developed a new Tax Code, which remains in force today.

4.2.2.1

The Russian Tax Code: Transfer Pricing Rules from 1999 to
2011

The Tax Code represented a codification of the principles existent in the previous Russian
tax system and a transition of the country to a tax system based on the rule of law,
establishing more precise boundaries for government authorities in determining tax
liabilities and interpreting statutes263. With respect to transfer pricing, the Tax Code, in its
Articles 20 and 40, introduced more comprehensive rules enabling tax authorities to adjust
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prices for tax reasons. These rules “were originally intended to be a temporary compromise
between rudimentary provisions that existed prior to that (the ‘sales below cost’ rules) and
OECD-type rules”264. As a result, although the Tax Code rules were based on the ALP,
there were considerable deviations from the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in terms
of definitions and procedures.
First of all, the transfer pricing rules of the Tax Code were used by tax authorities as antiavoidance measures, covering not only transactions between associated parties, but also
transactions between unrelated enterprises, under specific circumstances265. Article 40.2
authorized the transfer pricing administration to check the proper use of prices in the
following circumstances: a) transactions between interdependent persons; b) goods
exchange (barter) transactions; c) foreign trade transactions; and d) if there was a
fluctuation of more than 20 per cent in the prices practices by the taxpayer for identical or
similar goods or services over a short period of time266.
The scope of transactions covered by the transfer pricing rules effective during this period
was also significantly narrower as compared to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
Only prices referring to payments for products or services were subject to Russian transfer
pricing control. Consequently, interest – not being a payment for goods or services – was
exempt from transfer pricing rules. Accordingly, Russian courts tended to maintain the idea
that prices for intangible property, such as royalty or shares in Russian companies, could
not be adjusted for tax purposes267.
The Tax Code also established a “20 per cent safe-harbor deviation”, according to which
tax authorities could only adjust the price of controlled transactions for tax purposes if they
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could prove that the price practiced by the taxpayer was different from the market price268
by more than 20 per cent as prescribed in Article 40(3):
In the instances envisaged by clause 2 of this Article where the prices of
goods, work or services which are applied by the parties to a transaction
deviate upwards or downwards by more than 20 per cent against the market
price of identical (homogeneous) goods (work and services), the tax
authority shall have the right to issue a substantiated decision to charge
additional tax and penalties calculated as if the results of that transaction
had been assessed on the basis of market prices for the goods, work or
services in question269.
Considering that this 20 per cent ‘safe-harbor’ was not reproduced in Russian tax treaties270,
there were discussions about which norm should be applied: the treaty provisions or Article
40(3) of the Russian Tax Code. This debate took place because, since the main goal of tax
treaties is to ameliorate or eliminate double taxation by limiting countries’ tax
jurisdictions271, it could be assumed that the tax authorities could not apply tax treaty rules
that are less favourable for the taxpayer than the domestic provisions272. Indeed, although
Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty allows the adjustments to the taxable income of
associated enterprises when the prices between the two companies differ from those that
would have been stipulated between independent companies, the method used for these
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adjustments needs to be prescribed in the domestic laws of the country in which the transfer
pricing changes are made273.
Only the three traditional transaction transfer pricing methods were allowed to be applied:
the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method, the resale price method and the cost plus
method. These methods were required to be used in the exact order as they were listed and,
in order to use the next method, it was necessary to prove that the previous one either was
impossible to be applied or did not allow the establishment of a fair market price274.

4.2.2.2

Post-2012 Transfer Pricing Rules

On July 2011, the Russian Parliament approved a new transfer pricing law in an effort to
bring Russian transfer pricing rules closer to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. This
reform, described as the biggest change in Russian tax law since the enactment of the Tax
Code, introduced a variety of amendments to Russian tax law, such as the application of
the ALP and the removal of the so called “safe-harbor provision” in transfer pricing275. As
declared by the Russian government, the main purpose of this new law was to combat tax
avoidance through the use of transfer prices276. This convergence towards OECD’s
international standards on transfer pricing was enacted in a moment when the Russian
economy was not in its greatest position, representing an effort to attract more foreign
business and investments to the country277. The next section discusses details of these new
rules.

4.2.3

Transfer Pricing Rules in the Russian Federation

With effect from January 2012, Russia has included new transfer pricing rules applicable
to both domestic and international transactions in Chapters 14.1 to 14.6 (Tax Control) of

273

Ibid at 103.
Tax Code, Russian Federation 1999, Article 40(3).
275
Aleksei Hanninen, “To what extent business restrucuturing fall within the scope of transfer
pricing regulations in Russia” (2015) 43:11 Intertax 742 at 743.
276
Shpak, supra note 242 at 563.
277
“Transfer Pricing Brings Russia onto The World Stage” (2009) 19 International Tax Review 20.
274

72

the Russian Tax Code278. Articles 20 and 40 of the Russian Tax Code continue to be applied
regarding transactions, income and expenses reported by taxpayers prior to the entry of the
new transfer pricing law into force279.

4.2.3.1

Arm’s Length Principle

The previously accepted 20 per cent safe harbor rule was replaced by a market price/profit
range, expanding the extent of transactions between related parties potentially covered by
transfer pricing controls:
As this market price/profit range will serve as a safe harbor, the essence is
to establish the lower and upper quartiles as any actual price charged or
profitability level achieved by a taxpayer will be deemed to be in line with
market values (i.e. arm’s length) and therefore will not be subject to
adjustment, assuming of course that the tax authorities agree with the
taxpayer's general characterization of the related parties, the intercompany
transaction and the transfer pricing method and data applied280.
Regarding the sources of information, the previous rules provided in the Russian Tax Code
required the use of “official sources” of information in identifying the market price of a
transaction. Although the term “official sources” was not properly defined in the Tax Code,
according to court cases and other documents issued by Russian tax authorities, this
requirement meant that only Russian data were accepted281. The new transfer pricing law,
on the other hand, has allowed the use of foreign data in establishing the arm’s length price;
however, Russia data is still the first priority282.
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4.2.3.2

Scope of Application of the Transfer Pricing Rules

Russian transfer pricing rules can be applied to transactions between related entities and,
under certain circumstances, between unrelated parties as well. Therefore, all cross-border
transactions between related parties283 are covered by transfer pricing rules. Domestic
transactions between related parties can only be controlled if the revenues generated in
such transactions in a calendar year exceed a certain amount (in 2014, the amount was
approximately $33 million; however, lower thresholds are established for mineral
extraction and entities using beneficial tax regimes). Other than that, transactions between
unrelated parties are only subject to transfer pricing rules when they are made with regard
to certain traded commodities or with residents of listed low-tax jurisdiction, both subject
to the threshold of $2 million in a calendar year284. In this context, Joint Resolution of the
Supreme Court no. 9 of June 1999 emphasized that Russian transfer pricing control can
only be applied to the four types of transactions expressly listed in the law285.
Additionally, Russian courts are allowed to consider a transaction controlled, and
consequently subject it to transfer pricing control, when the referred transaction does not
meet the above-mentioned criteria due to conditions artificially created by taxpayer286.

4.2.3.3

Transfer Pricing Methods

The new transfer pricing law expands the number of methods used for determining the
arm’s length price of controlled transactions, allowing five methods to be used by tax
authorities and taxpayers: a) comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method; b) resale price
method; c) cost plus method; d) transactional net margin method (TNMM); and e) profit
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split method. In this context, Russian transfer pricing rules followed the methods
prescribed in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Nevertheless, the new law maintained
the notion of hierarchy of methods, treating the CUP method as the preferred methodology,
so tax authorities and taxpayers can only choose other methods when the CUP method
cannot be applied. The only exception is when a company purchases goods from a related
party and resells them to independent parties; in this case, priority is given for the resale
price method287.

4.2.4

Peculiarities and Challenges in Russia’s Transfer Pricing
Practices

The new Russian transfer pricing rules were designed to bring the country’s international
taxation practices closer to the standards adopted by the OECD and by other jurisdictions
with older and more developed tax systems. In this sense, although the new transfer pricing
law is closer to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines – particularly in comparison with
the country’s previous transfer pricing system – this does not mean that these provisions
will be interpreted in the same way as they would be according to the OECD transfer
pricing approach. Indeed, Russia is not a member of the OECD and, for this reason, the
country is not obliged to follow by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines288:
The current transfer pricing provisions of the Russian Tax Code correspond
to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines’ provisions to a great extent – at
least compared to the previous regulations. As mentioned earlier, the Tax
Code’s new rules are also widely based on the OECD’s Transfer Pricing
Guidelines. Nonetheless, Russia is not an OECD Member State, and
Russian tax authorities, as well as courts making decisions on tax matters,
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are not obliged to follow the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Therefore,
it should be noted that, while the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines may
provide interpretive help in situations where the Tax Code’s transfer pricing
rules are ambiguous and difficult to apply in practice, there is no surety of
that the tax authorities would interpret the unclear provisions in accordance
with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines289.
Furthermore, Russia still deviates from the OECD approach in significant ways in its new
rules290. For instance, the Russian Tax Code subjects, under certain circumstances, crossborder transactions between unrelated persons to transfer pricing controls, treating these
transactions as controlled, which is not prescribed in the OECD guidelines and not common
in most OECD members. Also, contrary to what is prescribed in the OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines, Russia transfer pricing law establishes a formal hierarchy in the
application of the methods for determining the arm’s length price of controlled
transactions.

4.2.4.1

Intangibles

The majority of Russia’s transfer pricing provisions refer to transactions involving goods,
works and services. As a result, some tax experts argue that, according to the interpretation
of Russian courts of the terms ‘goods, works and services’, the new transfer pricing rules
do not cover interest, royalties as well as any other transactions involving intangible
property:
According to the Tax Code, transfer pricing regulations are applied only to
related party transaction where commodities, services and/or work are being
transferred from one related party to another. As interpretation of Russian
law and overall judicial discretion in Russia are based on legal norms in
essence, it is very difficult to validate an argument according to which
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transfer of intangibles assets would fall within the scope of transfer pricing
regulations291.
On the other hand, there are more generic references in Russia’s transfer pricing law that
may lead to a different interpretation regarding intangible assets. In this context, the
Russian Ministry of Finance has claimed in a published written clarification that “both
royalties and interest should also be included in the scope of transfer pricing rules (as well
as any other transaction that has an impact on the tax base)”292. Although the Ministry of
Finance’s written clarification is not legally binding but rather informative – taxpayers and
tax authorities do not have to follow its arguments – it is a helpful interpretive guideline
regarding Russian transfer pricing provisions293.
Therefore, taxpayers usually comply with the Ministry of Finance’s clarifications because
it is difficult to forecast when Russian tax authorities will follow this understanding or not.

4.2.5

Conclusion

Russian transfer pricing rules have evolved alongside the country’s increasing integration
into the world economy. In this respect, it is possible to observe that, in conjunction with
Russia’s efforts to become a member of the OECD, its transfer pricing rules have also been
transformed in order to resemble the practices of more developed jurisdictions and those
recommended in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Although Russia’s new transfer
pricing law may minimize the risks of double taxation and reduce the compliance burden
for MNEs operating in the country, there are still some peculiarities in its practices,
particularly those developed in Russian courts under the Tax Code.
Nonetheless, in comparison with the other BRICS, Russia seems to be the country most
aligned with the OECD standards regarding transfer pricing. Indeed, either because its
transfer pricing rules are fairly recent and still under development or because of a
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compromise with the OECD’s standards, Russia was the only country among the BRICS
that did not have a representative participating in the UN Committee of Experts on
International Cooperation in Tax Matters, which was responsible for the UN Practical
Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries294.

4.3

India

In the case of Transfer Pricing, although it is governed by domestic legislation of
each country, the OECD countries have agreed on a common transfer pricing
guidelines known as OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and Tax Administrations. These guidelines on transfer pricing only
reflect the agreements amongst Government of those countries that are members of
OECD (developed countries) and accordingly tend to take care of interest of only
developed countries. The guidelines do not give right of taxation to source countries
accordingly eroding taxing rights of developing countries295.

4.3.1

Introduction

The increasing participation of MNEs in economic activities in India, due to the country’s
robust economic growth and consumer base, has given rise to complex challenges in
determining the transfer price of transactions between associated enterprises. In light of
these difficulties, India introduced in 2001, through Sections 92A to 92F of the Indian
Income Tax Act, comprehensive transfer pricing legislation, in which the country
established mechanisms for determining reasonable arm’s length prices and profits
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regarding controlled transactions. Since the introduction of this law, transfer pricing has
become the most important international tax issue affecting MNEs conducting their
business in India296, especially because, although Indian transfer pricing rules are broadly
based on OECD guidelines, they also deviate in some respects.
This section provides an overview on transfer pricing rules in India, focusing on the
challenges found by the country in applying the ALP and on the practical solutions it
applies. Therefore, this section is structured as follows: a) historical background of Indian
transfer pricing rules; b) transfer pricing regulations in India; and c) peculiarities and
challenges in India’s transfer pricing rules and practices, particularly those concerning
comparability analysis, location-specific advantages and intangible assets.

4.3.2

Historical Background

Until 1991, India’s economy was highly regulated, having elevated tariffs and a series of
exchange controls and obstacles to the process of integration with the world market297. Due
to the country’s economic isolation, although the erosion of its tax base through the
manipulation of the prices of goods and services was a possibility, the low number of crossborder transactions made the risk of transfer pricing abuse low298. Nevertheless, since 1991,
with the liberalization of trade and foreign exchange policy, India has been working on the
promotion of foreign investment and technical collaboration in order to grow in
productivity and achieve higher international competitiveness through the advantages of
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technology and marketing expertise transfers299. As the inflow of foreign direct investment
to India increased300, Indian tax authorities became more concerned with the possibilities
of transfer pricing abuse generated by the growth in the number of international
transactions.
Therefore, in 1999, the Indian government created an Expert Group to study global transfer
pricing practices and develop a framework for India’s transfer pricing law301. The Expert
Group considered the laws of several countries and especially the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines in drafting recommendations for India’s transfer pricing rules302, which were
the basis for the legislation subsequently enacted in 2001. Thus, in April 2001, India’s
Parliament enacted new provisions to the Indian Income Tax Act from 1961303, introducing
with the “Finance Act” the first legislation establishing India’s comprehensive transfer
pricing regime. According to the Finance Bill Explanatory Memorandum, the legislation
was created to control transfer pricing abuse and to prevent the erosion of Indian tax
revenues:
The increasing participation of multinational groups in economic activities
in the country has given rise to new and complex issues emerging from
transactions entered into between two or more enterprises belonging to the
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same multinational group. The profits derived by such enterprises carrying
on business in India can be controlled by the multinational group, by
manipulating the prices charged and paid in such intra-group transactions,
thereby leading to erosion of tax revenues. With a view to providing a
statutory framework which can lead to the computation of reasonable, fair,
and equitable profits and tax in India in the case of such multinational
enterprises, new provisions are proposed to be introduced in the Income Tax
Act304
Hence, the legislators’ idea behind the Finance Act was to provide a statutory framework
that could facilitate the determination of a reasonable, fair and arm’s length transfer price
for controlled transactions305.

4.3.3
4.3.3.1

Transfer Pricing Rules in India
The Arm’s Length Principle

As mentioned above, the Indian comprehensive transfer pricing legislation was introduced
in the form of Chapter X – sections 92 to 92F – of the Indian Income Tax Act. These
transfer pricing regulations were further elucidated in rules 10A to 10E of the Indian
Income Tax Rules. The Income Tax Act and the Income Tax Rules relate to the
determination of income from an international transaction having regard to the arm’s length
price; the concept of associated enterprise; the concept of information and documents; and
other important transfer pricing definitions.
According to Section 92.1, “any income arising from an international transaction shall be
computed having regard to the arm’s length price”306. The Section further specifies that, in
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an international transaction between two or more associated enterprises, when there is a
mutual agreement or arrangement for the allocation of any contribution, any cost or
expenses in connection with a benefit, service or facility provided to any one of such
enterprises, the allocation of costs and expenses shall be established having regard to the
arm’s length price of such benefit, service or facility307. Likewise, the price received for
services rendered to associated enterprises must also be determined based on the arm’s
length standard308. From these provisions, it is possible to observe that the foundation for
transfer pricing rules in India is the ALP. Accordingly, the Indian transfer pricing assessing
officer has extensive powers to establish what is the arm’s length price for the abovementioned transactions and to make adjustments for the computation of income309.

4.3.3.2

The Concept
Transactions

of

Associated

Enterprise

International

Section 92A defines that enterprises are “associated enterprises” when one enterprise is
controlled by the other or when both enterprises are controlled by a common third person310.
The concept of control in Indian transfer pricing law is not limited to control through
holding shares or voting power, but it is also extended to control through debt, blood
relationships and management over a series of components of the business activity
performed by the taxpayer, such as power over raw materials, sales and intangibles311.
Section 92B provides the meaning for “international transaction”, which is basically
defined as a cross border transaction between associated enterprises regarding any property
– tangible or intangible – as well as the provision of services, lending or borrowing of
money or any other transaction having a bearing on the profits, income, losses or assets of
such enterprises312. According to Sub-section (2) of Section 92B, the scope of the definition
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of international transaction is also extended to “deemed to be international transactions”,
which are transactions between unrelated persons where there is a prior agreement in
relation to the transaction between such person and an associated enterprise or when the
relevant terms of the transaction are determined by the associated enterprise313. Even
though no international transactions or industries are excluded from the possibility of a
transfer pricing investigation, recently, the focus of Indian transfer pricing officers have
been

the

software

development,

business

process

outsourcing

banking,

telecommunications, pharmaceutical and automobile industries314.
As transfer pricing provisions are only applied to the general concept of “international
transactions”, there have been several cases in India discussing the meaning of such
expression. Under the decided cases, the common understanding is that two requirements
must be met so a transaction is considered an international transaction: first, the transaction
must have occurred between associated enterprises and, second, one of the associated
enterprises must be non-resident in India315.

4.3.3.3

Transfer Pricing Methods

The Indian Income Tax Act, in Section 92C, provides six methods for the determination of
the arm’s length price regarding an international transaction: a) comparable uncontrolled
price (CUP) method; b) resale price method; c) cost-plus method; d) profit split method; e)
transactional net margin method (TNMM); and f) any other method as may be
prescribed316. As Indian law does not establish a hierarchy in the selection of the methods,
the method that is best suited to the facts and circumstances and that provides the most
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reliable measure of an arm’s length result is the one that should be adopted317, as prescribed
in Section 92C:
The arm's length price in relation to an international transaction or specified
domestic transaction shall be determined by any of the following methods,
being the most appropriate method, having regard to the nature of
transaction or class of transaction or class of associated persons or functions
performed by such persons or such other relevant factors as the Board may
prescribe, namely: (a) comparable uncontrolled price method; (b) resale
price method; (c) cost plus method; (d) profit split method; (e) transactional
net margin method; (f) such other method as may be prescribed by the
Board318.
In addition to the above methods, the taxpayer can establish the arm’s length price
regarding an international transaction using any other method as long as it takes into
account the price that would have been charged or paid for the same or similar uncontrolled
transaction, with or between associated enterprises, under similar circumstances319.
Furthermore, transfer pricing provisions will not be applied when the application of the
ALP would result in a downward adjustment in the income taxable in India320.

4.3.4

Peculiarities and Challenges in India’s Transfer Pricing
Practices

According to Sanjay Mishra, member of the United Nations Subcommittee on Transfer
Pricing, over the past fifteen years, Indian tax authorities have witnessed several challenges
in the administration of transfer pricing law, with transfer pricing audits causing numerous
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disputes and litigation321. Services rendered by Indian subsidiaries or Indian branches of
multinational companies to its foreign affiliates, for instance, have been thoroughly
examined by Indian transfer pricing officers in order to establish the appropriate level of
compensation received by the Indian taxpayer322. This section focuses on some of these
transfer pricing issues and challenges in the implementation of the ALP in India.

4.3.4.1

Challenges Regarding
Adjustments

Comparability

Analysis

and

Comparability is a key feature for the Indian Tax Administration in establishing the arm’s
length price of international transactions323. Indian transfer pricing rules provide that an
uncontrolled transaction is comparable to an international transaction when the
dissimilarities between the two will not substantially affect their prices or profits or when
reasonably precise adjustments can be made to eliminate the outcomes of such
dissimilarities324. To the extent possible, Indian transfer pricing administration maintains
that local Indian comparables should be used and generally does not accept the use of
foreign comparables325. However, due to the increasing market unpredictability and
complexity in intra-group international transactions, India has been facing several
challenges in its comparability analysis326, particularly regarding the evaluation of risks.
Since the basis of any comparability analysis, according to Indian transfer pricing
administration, consists in a “comparison of functions performed, assets employed and
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risks assumed”, the country’s practice is to evaluate the risks of an associated enterprise in
combination with its functions and assets327. Essentially, India’s tax authorities
understanding is that the effective risks328 assumed by an Indian subsidiary must be given
its due importance in determining the arm’s length price of an international transaction.
One central problem experienced by India is that MNEs claim that Indian subsidiaries
engaged in contract services – especially in research and development – are “risk-free”
entities and, for this reason, are entitled to low cost plus remuneration329. In such cases, the
Indian Tax Administration does not agree “with the notion that risk can be controlled
remotely by the parent company and that the Indian subsidiaries or related party engaged
in core functions, such as carrying out research and development activities or providing
services are risk free entities”330. Indeed, in many circumstances, MNE’s core functions of
performing research and development activities or providing services are located in India,
which involves the making of critical strategic decisions – regarding, for instance, the
designing of a product or software or the monitoring of research activities – by the
management and employees of Indian subsidiaries331. Consequently, the Indian subsidiary
has control over the operational activities and other risks, while the parent company has a
more limited control over risks remotely located332.
As the margin earned by the above-mentioned “risk-free” Indian subsidiaries cannot be
compared with other independent enterprises’ margins – because there would be a
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discrepancy between the risks undertaken by them333 – economic adjustments to account
for the differences in risk profiles are usually necessary. In this context, Indian transfer
pricing law require “reasonably accurate comparability adjustments”; nevertheless, “the
Indian transfer pricing administration finds it difficult to make risk adjustments in the
absence of any reliable, robust and internationally agreed methodology to provide risk
adjustment”334.
Case law involving issues in transfer pricing and enterprises’ risks assessment demonstrate
how this is a controversial matter in Indian transfer pricing law. In Li and Fung India Pvt
v. CIT335, for example, the taxpayer company was resident in India and was a wholly-owned
subsidiary of a Mauritius company, providing sourcing services to an associated enterprise.
The associated enterprise entered into services contracts with third-party customers and
subcontracted the work to the taxpayer, which was remunerated at a cost plus 5 percent
mark-up (claiming it was a low risk service provider performing limited functions with
minimal risks). The Indian tax authorities recommended a transfer pricing adjustment to
this transfer price arguing that the Indian subsidiary was a risk bearing entity as well as an
independent entrepreneur and, for this reason, it could not be considered a risk-free entity.
However, the Court decision considered the transfer pricing adjustment unjustified
because, among other reasons, it was not proved that the Indian company assumed
significant risks. According to the decision, the Indian subsidiary made no investment in
the plant, inventory, working capital nor assumed the risk for manufacturing and exporting
goods, merely rendering support services in relation to these exported goods. Therefore,
the court sustained that Indian tax authorities must assess the risks on specific facts and not
on vague terms, such as ‘significant risk’, ‘functional risk’, ‘enterprise risk’ without
material records to establish such conclusions.
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The captive units are expected to continue earning a mark-up over costs regarding the provision
of the services. Comparable independent enterprises, on the other hand, undertake a broader set of
risks and, for this reason, generally earn super profits or significant losses. Butani, supra note 287
at 623.
333
UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 391.
334
Ibid at 586.
335
Li and Fung India Pvt v CIT, (2013), (Delhi High Court, India).
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In another relevant ruling, Deloitte Consulting India Pvt Ltd v CIT336, the Income-Tax
Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal) rejected adjustments claimed for lower risk borne by a
captive “risk free” service provider. In this case, the Indian subsidiary entered into a
software development service agreement with Deloitte Consulting USA to provide
software related services. The Indian subsidiary provided a warranty to its parent company
to deliver its work free of errors, which according to the Tribunal’s decision amounted to
undertaking a broader set of risks. Therefore, there were no differences between the risk
profiles of the taxpayer and comparable independent enterprises and, consequently, no
economic adjustments were needed.

4.3.4.2

Location-Specific Advantages

India, as a low-cost jurisdiction, provides numerous Location-Specific Advantages (LSAs)
to MNEs performing economic activities in the country. These advantages include but are
not limited to the availability of a highly skilled, specialized and knowledgeable workforce
at a low-cost; lower raw material and infrastructure costs; reasonably priced rental spaces;
direct and indirect tax incentives; access and proximity to large and growing local/regional
markets; large customer base with increasing spending power, etc337. As MNEs are
increasingly outsourcing their manufacturing and service functions to captive units in
India, LSAs arising from the relatively lowers costs of Indian operations have become a
concern for the country’s transfer pricing administration338.
The main issue regarding LSAs involves their quantification and allocation among the
associated enterprises. Under an arm’s length approach, this allocation should be done in
accordance to what independent parties would have agreed in comparable circumstances.
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Deloitte Consulting India Pvt Ltd v CIT (2011), (Mumbai Bench Tribunal, India).
UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 587.
338
“The Indian tax authorities are increasingly recognizing the concept of location savings and
attributing high returns to location savings, particularly in the BPO and IT sectors. During the
course of audits, TPOs have been adjusting captive subsidiary income upwards due to location
savings. Though the standard markup for captive service providers is normally in the range of cost
plus 10%- 16%, in some cases TPOs have been raising the markup to 25%-34% on the grounds
that the Indian entity is realizing location savings.” Gandhi, Sharma and Alshi, supra note 288.
337
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In this context, the current position of the Indian transfer pricing administration – as stated
in the 2017 UN Practical Manual – is that, where comparable uncontrolled transactions are
available, the comparability analysis and benchmarking by using the results/profit margins
of such local comparable companies will determine the arm’s length price of a transaction
with a related party in a low-cost jurisdiction339. Therefore, on one hand, if reliable local
comparables are available, the benefits of LSAs will be properly captured in the arm’s
length price; on the other hand, if reliable local comparables are not available, the
consideration of LSAs’ benefits will still be an issue340.
The above Indian transfer pricing administration’s position departs from the previous
Indian considerations on the subject in the previous UN Practical Manual version. In the
2013 UN Manual edition, India maintained the view that an arm’s length price determined
on the basis of local comparables would not adequately allocate LSAs341 because it would
not compute the cost difference between a low-cost country and a high-cost country from
where the business operations were relocated. The current Indian views are more aligned
with the position advocated in the BEPS Actions 8-10 report as explored in Chapter 5342.
Even before the revision of its position in the UN Practical Manual, the latest Indian
approach was already being applied in judicial cases involving location savings. In Watson
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UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 587.
Ibid.
341
In the previous 2013 version of the UN Practical Manual, Indian representatives stated that
“Comparability analysis and benchmarking by taking local comparables will determine the price
of a transaction with a related party in a low-cost jurisdiction. However, it will not take into account
the benefit of location savings which can be computed by taking into account the cost difference
between costs in the low-cost country and in the high-cost country from where the business activity
was relocated. In view of this, the price determined on the basis of local comparables is not
consistent with the arm’s length price because any arm’s length transaction between two unrelated
parties would not be possible without benefiting both parties to the transaction”. Ibid at 395.
342
There was a more expressive divergence between the previous Indian understanding and the
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which state that the location savings may be shared between
related parties on the basis of what independent parties would have negotiated in similar
circumstances. In this sense, the OECD approach recommends the use of local market comparables
in order to establish the arm’s length price instead of comparability adjustments for location
savings. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines supra note 8 at para 9149.
340
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Pharma Pvt Ltd v CIT343, the taxpayer was engaged in contract manufacturing for its
associated enterprises and provided them contract research and development services,
being compensated on a total operating cost plus arm’s length mark-up basis. Indian
transfer pricing officers made an adjustment in the taxpayer’s profits because of the
location savings the associated enterprises had in transferring the referred activities from
the United States of America to India. Nonetheless, the Tribunal deleted this location
savings adjustment because, in this case, the taxpayer did not have exclusive access to
factor leading to LSAs344 and, consequently, did not have a unique advantage that could
generate a super profit arising in the entire supply chain. This way, the Tribunal ruled that,
when local market comparables are available and used, specific adjustments for location
savings are not required.

4.3.4.3

Intangibles

Transfer pricing of intangibles has been a challenging area for the Indian tax administration
because, not only are intangible assets difficult to detect, but they are also rarely traded in
the external market, which makes it hard to find reliable comparables in the public domain.
Some of the main issues regarding the transfer price of intangible property involve the
determination of the arm’s length price of royalties, the remuneration for research and
development intangibles and the allocation of the cost of development of the market and
brand in a new country345.
With regard to the payment of royalties346, serious challenges have been encountered in
determining the arm’s length rate in relation to the price charged for the use of brands and
trademarks in certain cases. Indian tax authorities argue that the “royalty rate charged by
the MNE should depend upon the cost borne by the subsidiary or related party to promote
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Watson Pharma Pvt Ltd v CIT (2015), (Mumbai Tribunal, India).
According to the decision, the associated enterprises operated in a completely competitive
market and, for this reason, the taxpayer did not have exclusive location-specific advantages or
unique advantages over its competitors.
345
UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 588.
346
Intangible assets, such as intellectual property, which is owned by one entity and used by another
entity, generally requires a royalty payment as a compensation for its use. Ibid at 588.
344
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the brand and trademark and to develop customer loyalty for that brand and product”347.
Indeed, the Indian view is that, in an emerging market such as India, in many cases, the
local subsidiary should be entitled to receive an arm’s length compensation for the
economic ownership of the brand and trademark developed by the subsidiary in the country
and for improving the value of the brand and trademark legally owned by the parent
company348.
The Indian transfer pricing administration has also noticed that Indian subsidiaries using
the technical know-how of their parent companies have incurred significant costs to
customize such know-how and to increase its value. In these cases, in determining the
arm’s length price of royalties for the use of technical know-how, Indian tax authorities
take into consideration the costs of activities – research and development activities, for
instance – that have contributed to enhancing the value of the know-how owned by the
foreign parent company349.
Marketing intangibles have also been a focus area for Indian tax authorities, especially
because of the unique market characteristics of the country regarding location advantages,
market accessibility, large consumer base, market premium, etc. Indian subsidiaries usually
have substantial marketing activities – including adding value to brands, trademarks and
trade names owned by parent companies as well as creating marketing intangibles such as
costumer lists and dealer networks – and the expenditure regarding these marketing
functions has been the subject of transfer pricing adjustments in India350. These adjustments
have been questioned in the judicial instance in India and, while the matter is still not finally
decided by the Indian Supreme Court, the decisions of the High Courts and Tribunals have
elucidated that: a) the existence of an international transaction regarding any service or
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Intangible assets, such as intellectual property, which is owned by one entity and used by another
entity, generally requires a royalty payment as a compensation for its use. Ibid.
348
Ibid.
349
Ibid at 589.
350
According to Indian transfer pricing administration, these functions carried out by Indian
subsidiaries, which promoted the brands and developed marketing intangibles for their parent
companies outside India, deserve a compensation. Ibid at 591.
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benefit must be established before transfer pricing provisions can be applied; and b) the
mere excessive expenditure of an associated enterprise with advertisement, marketing and
promotion is not enough to establish the existence of such a transaction351.
One noteworthy case is Maruti Suzuki India Ltd v CIT352, in which the taxpayer, who
manufactured and sold cars, had a license agreement with its associated enterprise for use
of licensed information and a licensed trademark for the manufacture and sale of the
products. According to these agreements, the taxpayer paid royalties for the licensed
trademarks and for the technology license. The Indian transfer pricing officer made an
adjustment by disallowing the royalties paid by the taxpayer and imputing as
reimbursement with mark-up on the customized advertising, marketing and promotion
expenses incurred in promoting the associated enterprise’s brand in India. The Indian court
decided in favor of the taxpayer, ruling that the excessive advertisement, sales and
promotion expenditure incurred by licensed manufacturers cannot be used as the basis for
inferring the existence of an international transaction that could warrant a transfer pricing
adjustment.

4.3.5

Conclusion

As it is the case with other emerging economies, India has a relatively recent transfer
pricing comprehensive law, which was significantly influenced by the practices and
experiences of the OECD353 and its member countries. Nonetheless, the implementation of
transfer pricing rules that were established according to developed countries’ realities may
not always reflect the necessities and challenges encountered in a country with a different
stage of development, such as India. For this reason, India – which has constantly pointed
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Ibid at 592.
Maruti Suzuki India Ltd v CIT (2015), (Delhi High Court, India).
353
Although India is not a member of the OECD, it has been invited to participate as an observer
in the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs, which is responsible for setting international tax
standards, including in the area of transfer pricing. In general, India’s tax regulations adopt the
OECD principles and follow the OECD guidelines. PwC, “International Transfer Pricing
2015/2016”, PwC Network, online: <www.pwc.com/internationaltp>.
352
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out the “unfairness of the extant international order relating to international taxation”354 –
maintains some views contrary to the international standard rules in the area of transfer
pricing, particularly regarding issues such as comparability analysis, risks, location savings
and intangible property.
Although the Indian transfer pricing law was introduced more than fifteen years ago, it is
constantly evolving. Recent transfer pricing audits have brought some controversial issues
to light and resulted in a number of disputes between taxpayers and Indian tax authorities.
Thus, India currently has a mass of jurisprudence regarding the international taxation of
MNEs and, more specifically, transfer pricing. In this context, since the OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines play a supplementary role in transfer pricing on cases where the Indian
legislation is silent355, in many situations, there is a divergence between the Indian transfer
pricing administration – the positions that Indian representatives expressed in the UN
Practical Manual, for instance – and the decisions of Indian courts on transfer pricing
issues.

4.4

China

As the world economy becomes increasingly globalized, transfer pricing is an issue
faced not only by developed countries, but is increasingly a critical matter for
developing countries. Such nations face a set of unique issues that have not been
addressed, or at least not sufficiently or practically addressed by the OECD
Guidelines356.

354

According to D.P. Sengupta, “despite being a populous, poor and fractious democracy for the
majority of its independent existence, when negotiating international agreements, India has never
been completely dominated by any other party. To borrow an analogy from economics, it has never
behaved like a typical price taker”. Sengupta, supra note 304 at 115.
355
Indian jurisprudence has a variety of examples in which the courts have endorsed reference to
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Commentary in interpreting and applying Indian
transfer pricing law. Butani, supra note 287 at 632.
356
Tizhong Liao, Deputy Director of the International Taxation Department of the State
Administration of Taxaton (People’s Republic of China) and Wang Xiaoyue, Director of Anti-
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4.4.1

Introduction

China is regarded as a relative “late-comer” in the global transfer pricing area358, having
followed the international tax experience of other countries to create its own transfer
pricing system360. Today, transfer pricing is one of Chinese tax authorities main focus,
especially due to the following factors: 1) the growing relevance of imports and exports as
a proportion of China’s GDP; 2) the propensity for Chinese affiliates to rely on intellectual
property and services provided by foreign-related parties; 3) the institution of rigorous
transfer pricing rules in some of China’s strategic trading partners; 4) the accession of the
country to the World Trade Organization, which resulted in a reduction in its tariff rates
and, consequently, created pressure for greater revenues; 5) the inclination for Chinese
affiliates to declare operating losses; and 6) policy changes that eliminated some tax
incentives for foreign invested enterprises and may motivate MNEs to use transfer pricing
strategies to reduce their tax liability in the country361.
While China has accepted the ALP and OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines methodologies,
its transfer pricing system is still in a process of development. This is because, although
China deals with the same transfer pricing problems faced by developed countries, it also
encounters particular challenges related to its nature as a developing country with an
emerging economy. Therefore, this section will analyze how China applies and reconciles
the ALP with its unique national market features as well as the challenges the country faces
in employing international transfer pricing regulations in practical situations. In order to
understand these concepts, the development of transfer pricing rules in China will be
reviewed as well as the current Chinese transfer pricing law.

Avoidance Division of the International Taxation Department of the State Administration of
Taxation in UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 374.
358
Only from the 1980s onwards, China began to create its own unique transfer pricing system.
Michelle Markham and Yixin Liao, “The Development of Transfer Pricing in China” (2014) 29:4
Australian Tax Forum 715.
360
According to Michele Markham and Yixin Liao, “China’s basic transfer pricing principles and
methods, including the use of comparable factors and a comparability analysis, are the result of a
direct transplantation of the relevant provisions from the OECD TPG”. Ibid at 742.
361
Chris Devonshire-Ellis, Andy Scott and Sam Woollard, Transfer Pricing in China 2nd ed
(Heildelberg: Springer, 2011) at 4-5.
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4.4.2

Historical Background

4.4.2.1.1

China’s Open Door Policies and Pre-2008 Transfer
Pricing Regulations

China has begun opening up to foreign investments in 1979, with the implementation of
kaifang zhengce362: a series of open door policies directed to increasing the country’s
participation in the world market and promoting technological modernization, especially
through the diffusion of foreign technology363. As a result, multinational enterprises were
allowed to invest in China as joint ventures or wholly-owned subsidiaries364, thus
facilitating foreign investments. Consequently, the country started to experience
international transactions of goods, services and intangibles between related enterprises as
well as the associated transfer pricing issues.
Following China’s opening-up policy, a variety of laws were drafted to regulate foreign
investments, including the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning
Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment365, promulgated on September 10,
1980 and the Income Tax Law applicable to Foreign Enterprises366, promulgated in 1981.
The former was focused on equity joint ventures composed of a foreign investor and a
Chinese partner. The latter was focused on other categories of foreign investments, such as
contractual joint ventures, joint explorations and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Since
China’s main objective was to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and the export of
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According to Roger Hayter and Sun Sheng Han, kaifang zhengce was formally introduced by
the “Act of Joint Venture Enterprises”, which regulated principles related to Chinese national
sovereignty and international practices of foreign enterprises, permitting the approval of foreign
investments if they were beneficial for China. Roger Hayter and Sun Sheng Han, “Reflections on
China’s Open Policy Towards Foreign Direct Investment” (1997) 32:1 Regional Studies 1 at 6-7.
363
Xiaowen Tian, “China’s Open-door Policy in Development Perspective” (1996) 17:1 Canadian
Journal of Development Studies 75 at 76-78.
364
Hayter and Han, supra note 349 at 9.
365
Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese and
Foreign Investment, People’s Republic of China 1980.
366
Income Tax Law Applicable to Foreign Enterprises, People’s Republic of China 1981.
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Chinese-made products into the international market, both laws contained substantial tax
incentives, especially for joint ventures operating with a local equity partner367.
None of these tax laws established transfer pricing rules, creating a favourable environment
for foreign investors to design strategies to reallocate their profits from China to other
jurisdictions. Therefore, from the 1980s to the early 1990s, Chinese tax authorities did not
challenge transfer pricing practices368. The lack of transfer pricing rules and investigations
demonstrates how, at that time, rather than being a major concern for Chinese authorities,
aggressive transfer pricing was perceived as an inherent part of the new MNE’s businesses
in the country. In the case of joint ventures, for instance, since the Chinese partners were
not experienced in dealing with the world market – due to decades of closed-door policies
in China – the foreign partner was usually responsible for selling the products to the
international market and for purchasing technology, equipment and materials. This type of
arrangement provided the foreign partner with the ability to control the prices of the
transactions between the related enterprises369. Furthermore, Chinese tax incentive
measures encouraged foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) to export all or greater part of
their products370. Maintaining low prices for these products made them more competitive
in the international market and shifted profits from the Chinese affiliates to its related
enterprises overseas.

367

According to Jinyan Li, during the 1980s and 1990s, tax incentives in the form of special
preferential tax regimes were thriving in China. The author explains that “granting tax preference
was a key strategy from political, cultural and economic perspective. Politically, granting tax
preferences to FDI sent a clear signal to foreign investors China’s desire for their investment. This
signaling effect was historically important because China suffered from serious image problems
due to its previous hostile policies to foreign investors”. Jinyan Li, “The Rise and Fall of Chinese
Tax Incentives and Implications for International Tax Debates” (2007) 8:7 Florida Tax Review 670
at 673 [Li, “Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives”].
368
Ibid at 635.
369
Ibid.
370
Article 6 of the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign
Investment and Foreign Enterprises prescribes that “the State shall, in accordance with the
industrial policies, guide the orientation of foreign investment and encourage the establishment of
enterprises with foreign investment which adopt advanced technology and equipment and export
all or greater part of their products”. Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for
Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises, People’s Republic of China 1991,
Article 6.
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By the end of the 1980s, three quarters of the FIEs operating in China were reporting tax
losses, mainly due to transfer pricing371. Besides representing a potential loss of tax revenue
for the country, transfer pricing also caused a loss of profit to the Chinese partner – usually
state-owned enterprises – in the joint venture372. In response, the National People’s
Congress enacted in April 1991 the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China for
Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises (the “ITEF”), introducing in
its Article 13 the first Chinese transfer pricing legislation373. Article 13 established the
ALP374 as the Chinese standard to define the appropriate transfer price in transactions
between FIEs and their associated enterprises.
In June 1991, the Rules for the Implementation of the ITEF375 were promulgated. These
rules, in its Chapter IV (Dealings between Associated Enterprises), detailed the application
of Article 13 of the ITEF. Subsequently, the State Administration of Taxation (SAT)376
published a circular entitled The Implementation Measures for the Tax Administration of
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Jinyan Li, “Transfer Pricing Disputes in China” in Eduardo Baistrocchi and Ian Roxan, eds,
Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 2012 at 637
[Li, “Transfer Pricing Disputes in China”].
372
Ibid at 638.
373
Article 13 of the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign
Investment and Foreign Enterprises provides that the payment or receipt of charges or fees in
business transactions between an enterprise with foreign investment, or an establishment or a place
set up in China by a foreign enterprise to engage in production or business operations, and its
associated enterprises, shall be made in the same manner as the payment or receipt of charges or
fees in business transactions between independent enterprises. Where the payment or receipt of
charges or fees is not made in the same manner as in business transactions between independent
enterprises and results in a reduction of the taxable income, the tax authorities shall have the right
to make reasonable adjustments. Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China for Enterprises
with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises, People’s Republic of China 1991, Article 13.
374
The establishment of the arm’s length principle in China was not seen as a surprise: the country
had been following international tax norms, with the necessary modifications to suit local
conditions and the principle had already been included in a great number of Chinese tax treaties,
being viewed as “the only realistic solution to the transfer pricing problem”. Li, “Transfer Pricing
Disputes in China” supra note 358 at 638.
375
Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises, People’s republic of China 1991.
376
The State Administration of Taxation (SAT) is the primary tax authority in China. It consists in
a ministry-level organization that regulates taxation from a strategic, regulatory and oversight
perspective. Inside the SAT, there is the International Tax Department, which controls anti-tax
evasion. Devonshire-Ellis, Scott and Woollard, supra note 348 at 2.
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Transactions between Associated Enterprises in 1992 as well as a series of comprehensive
operative measures to implement the general transfer pricing rules377. During this period,
considered the “second stage of development for Chinese transfer pricing legislation”378,
China progressively created a comprehensive transfer pricing system, formed by tax laws,
administrative regulations and departmental rules.

4.4.2.2

The 2008 Enterprise Income Law

After China’s accession to the WTO in 2001379, Chinese internal markets were opened to
goods produced by FIEs and Chinese companies were encouraged to invest overseas380.
This increase in the integration between China and the global economy intensified the
complexity of transfer pricing issues in the country. China’s accession to the WTO has also
resulted in a reduction in the country’s tariff rates, creating concerns about raising revenues
for the country. In this context, transfer pricing issues have become one of China’s SAT
main focus, particularly because of the tendency for Chinese subsidiaries of MNEs to rely
on intellectual property and services provided by overseas related parties, as well as to
declare operating losses: over 50% of enterprises’ losses in China in 2011 were generated
by foreign owned enterprises381.

377

These included the Implementing Measures of the State Administration of Taxation for the Tax
Administration of Business Transactions between Associated Enterprises (Guoshuifa [1992]
No.237), 1992, Notice on Several Specific Issues in the Implementation of the Implementing
Measures of the State Administration of Taxation for the Tax Administration of Business
Transactions between Associated Enterprises (Guoshuifa [1992] No. 242), 1992, the
Administrative Regulations on the Taxation of Business Transactions between Associated
Enterprises (Guoshuifa [1998] No. 59) 1998, Notice of the State Administration of Taxation on
Distributing the (Trial) Implementing Rules for Negotiated Pricing for the Transactions Among
Associated Enterprises (Guoshuifa [2004] No. 118), 2004 and Rules for the Administration of
Business Transactions between A liated Enterprises (Guoshuifa [2004] No.143) 2004. Markham
and Liao, supra note 346 at 718.
378
Ibid.
379
World Trade Organization, “Accessions: China”, online: World Trade Organization <https://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_chine_e.htm>
380
In order to be formally admitted to the WTO, China had to follow concession commitments
related to market access to goods, foreign trade liberalization and tariff barrier reduction under
GATT. Ling-Ling He and Razeen Sappideen, “Reflections on China’s WTO Accession
Commitments and Their Observance” (2009) 43:4 Journal of World Trade 847 at 851.
381
Devonshire-Ellis, Scott and Woollard, supra note 348 at 4-5.
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Therefore, a new stage in the development of transfer pricing began in March 2007, with
the introduction of the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China382
(the EIT Law) by the National People’s Congress383. The EIT Law eliminated most of the
previous preferential tax regimes and established a harmonized tax rate of 25 per cent384,
resulting in a substantially higher tax burden to most foreign investors. With the
elimination of tax incentives, MNE’s tax planning shifted from seeing China “as a low-tax
location where it is desirable to recognize profits to a relatively high-tax jurisdiction in
which the goal is to minimize taxable profits”385, turning transfer pricing into an even more
relevant issue for the country. This new phase is characterized by a rigorous
implementation of the Chinese transfer pricing regulations and strengthening tax
investigations of transactions between related enterprises386. Since the beginning of this
new stage in 2008, the number of enterprises being investigated in China increased
annually, which consequently increased the amount of tax collected from MNEs387.

382

Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China, People’s Republic of China 2007
(hereinafter ‘EIT Law’).
383
In November 2007, the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Implementation of
the Enterprise Income Tax Law were published, detailing important transfer pricing rules in its
Articles 109 to 115.
384
Before the new EIT Law, many foreign invested companies were subject to 15 per cent or 24
per cent tax rates, combined with tax holidays to eliminate or reduce by half the applicable tax rate
for a certain number of years. Jon Eichelberger and Brendan Kelly, “Tax Planning Strategies in
Response to China’s Changing Tax Landscape: Issues and Structures to be Considered in a PostTax Unification China” (2008) 36:5 Intertax 221 at 221.
385
Ibid.
386
Markham and Liao, supra note 346 at 720.
387
In 2007, China was the eighth most aggressive tax authority in regards to transfer pricing.
(Transfer Pricing Week, “Top 10 toughest tax authorities for transfer pricing in 2007” (2007),
online: TP Week: <https://www.tpweek.com/articles/top-10-toughest-tax-authorities-for-transferpricing-in-2007/arejkape>). Three years later, because of this new severer phase in its transfer
pricing investigations, the country was ranked the third most aggressive tax authority in 2010.
(Transfer Pricing Week, “Asian Countries Top Aggressive Tax Authorities Poll”, (2010), online:
TP
Week:
<https://www.tpweek.com/articles/asian-countries-top-aggressive-tax-authoritypoll/arddwcch>.)
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4.4.3

Transfer Pricing Regulations in China

4.4.3.1.1

The Arm’s Length Principle

Chinese tax treaties commonly follow Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty concerning the
ALP388. At present, the main Chinese transfer pricing regulations are the EIT Law (Articles
41 to 44), the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Implementation of the
Enterprise Income Tax Law389 (Article 109-115), the Rules for the Implementation of the
Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Tax Collection390(the “EIT
Regulations”) (Articles 51-56), administrative regulations and guidelines issued by the
SAT and tax treaties. Article 41 of the EIT Law codifies the ALP as follows:
Article 41. As regards a transaction between an enterprise and its affiliated
parties, in case the taxable revenue or income of the enterprise or its
affiliated parties reduces by virtue of the failure to conform to the arm’s
length principle, the tax organ may, through a reasonable method, make an
adjustment. As regards the costs of an enterprise and its affiliated parties for
jointly developing or accepting intangible assets, or jointly providing or
accepting labor services, they shall, when calculating the taxable income
amount, apportion them according to the arm’s length principle391.
Thus, enterprises must conduct business transactions with their affiliated parties observing
the ALP, which, according to Article 110 of the EIT Regulations, refers to “the principle
adopted by unrelated parties in carrying out transactions with each other according to a fair

388

China has signed tax treaties with 102 countries and Article 9 of the OECD Model is included
in the majority of them. The Chinese treaties that do not include Article 9 are older agreements
signed before 1991, such as the ones with Austria, Brazil, Canada, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Norway,
Poland, Spain and Thailand. In new treaties signed after 2007 – replacing older treaties where
Article 9 was not included, such as those with Belgium, France, Germany, Singapore, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom – Article 9 was incorporated in accordance to the OECD Model.
389
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Implementation of the Enterprise Income
Tax Law, People’s Republic of China 2007.
390
Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration
of Tax Collection, People’s Republic of China 2002.
391
EIT Law, Article 41.
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price and a normal business practice”392. The main goal of transfer pricing rules is to ensure
that related parties are pricing their transactions using the ALP, making sure that these
transactions have a fair market value price and that the Chinese tax base is protected. In
cases where the transactions between related enterprises are not conducted at arm’s length
and, as a result, the amount of taxable income in China is reduced, the EIT Law allows
Chinese tax authorities to make reasonable adjustments.

4.4.3.2

The Concept of Related Party Transactions

Chinese transfer pricing rules are applied to transactions between related parties or
associated parties393. The concept of “related parties” is provided in Article 109 of the EIT
Regulations, according to which “related parties, as cited in Article 41 of the EIT Law,
refer to enterprises, other entities and individuals, which have any of the following
relationships with an enterprise: 1) direct or indirect control over such matters as finance,
business operations, purchases and sales, etc.; 2) both directly or indirectly controlled by a
third party; 3) other relationship due to associated interests”394. In regards to the criteria for
determining if an enterprise is considered to be related to another enterprise, economic
organization or individual, Chinese tax authorities adopt a substance test as opposed to a
legalistic and formal approach395. Although the scope of the transfer pricing law is broad,
comprehending all forms of related party transactions, international transactions are, in
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practice, the SAT’s main targets of investigation396. If the parties of a transaction are not
related, even if the transaction involves parties in tax havens, transfer pricing rules are not
applied. In this case, the General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) may be applied.
According to Article 10 of The Administrative Measures of Special Tax Adjustments
(Circular [2009] No. 2), related party transactions include the following categories: 1) the
sale, purchase, transfer and use of tangible property; 2) the transfer and use of intangible
property, including providing the right to use licenses as well as industrial property rights;
3) financing, including all types of interest-bearing advances and deferred payments, loans
and security; and 4) the provision of services397. The focus of early transfer pricing
investigations by the SAT was generally on transactions of tangible goods, including
selling, purchasing, assigning and leasing tangible property such as buildings, means of
transport, machinery, tools and products398. Recently, the Chinese revenue authorities have
been more concentrated on transactions involving intangible property399 and the provision
of services400.

4.4.3.3

Transfer Pricing Methods

Under the EIT Law and the EIT Regulations, the transfer pricing methods used to calculate
the arm’s length price of a transactions include, but are not limited to the internationally
recognized methods. Therefore, taxpayers and tax authorities may use the comparable
uncontrolled price method (CUP), the resale price method, the cost-plus method, the
transactional net margin method (TNMM), the profit split method as well as any “other
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reasonable method” to evaluate if the ALP was followed401. The definition of other
reasonable methods, in this case, seems to be dictated more by the “right outcome”, i.e.,
what the Chinese tax authorities want, rather than the right process or methodology”,
according to the Chinese “substance-over-form” pragmatic and holistic approach to tax
avoidance402.
China follows the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines recommendation with regards to the
selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method – whether it is one of the
traditional transaction methods or one of the transactional profit methods – to the
circumstances of the case in analysis403. Similar to the OECD, Chinese tax authorities have
also reviewed their position of recommending a hierarchy between transfer pricing
methodologies and currently allow the most reasonable applicable method to be used404.
Chapter 4 of Circular [2009] No. 2 provides detailed instructions regarding the selection
of the appropriate transfer pricing method, based on the different types of existing
transactions and their characteristics405.
When the taxpayer fails to provide information on its transactions with associated
enterprises or provides false or incomplete information, Article 44 of the EIT Law
authorizes tax authorities to assess the taxable profit on the taxpayer’s income in relation
to the related party transaction on a deemed basis406. The reason for allowing this power to
the SAT – which increases the revenue authorities control in regulating transfer pricing
abuses – is the perceived information asymmetry existent between the taxpayer and the
Chinese tax authorities407. Since this discretion to tax on a deemed basis may damage
legitimate interests of taxpayers, the exercise of this power needs to comply with the
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prescribed procedures defined in Article 115 of the EIT Regulations, which prescribes that
the determination of the acceptable transfer price can be assessed: 1) by reference to the
profit rate level of identical or similar enterprises; 2) based on the cost of the enterprise
plus a reasonable amount of expenses and profit margin; 3) based on a reasonable
proportion out of the total profits earned by the related party group; or 4) based on any
other reasonable method408. Article 115 also establishes that the burden to prove the deemed
tax payable lies with the tax authority and that, if the taxpayer does not agree with the
result, it may provide opposing evidence409. Although these rules limit the power of the
SAT, the condition that allows the imposition of taxes on a deemed basis – in cases of false
or incomplete information provided by the taxpayer – is considered vague and,
consequently, may induce the SAT to skip the need to “collect sufficient information and
conduct a careful comparability analysis” and proceed straightforwardly to taxing in
accordance to what they deem the taxpayer’s income to be410.

4.4.4

Peculiarities and Challenges in China’s Transfer Pricing
Practices

During the implementation of transfer pricing rules in China, the ALP was ‘transplanted’
from Western countries into an extremely different legal culture in China411. Although
China has unique economic and legal features, years of closed-door policies – resulting in
a lack of experience in regulating international transactions – led the country to base great
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part of its transfer pricing system on the knowledge and practices from developed
countries. In comparison with developed countries, China is still at an early stage of
development and, while the transfer pricing problems the country faces may be similar to
those encountered by more developed economies, it also has to deal with particular
challenges prevalent in developing countries412.
The ALP, to a large extent, clashes with important elements of Chinese legal and political
approaches as explained by Jinyan Li:
The notion of ‘arm’s length’ is ‘foreign’ to the Chinese cultural emphasis
on ‘guanxi’ or ‘relationships’. In the Chinese culture, ‘insiders’ are expected
to treat each other differently from ‘outsiders’. Insiders value the long-term
relationship and may not care about immediate cost or benefits. Expecting
‘insiders’ to behave like strangers in the eyes of law may require a cultural
shift. Furthermore, the rules-based application of the arm’s length principle
is not an easy fit with the Chinese holistic, pragmatic approach to problemsolving. The Chinese approach is exemplified by Deng Xiaoping’s famous
saying that ‘It doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches
mice413.
In this context, important aspects in the Chinese transfer pricing system demonstrate how
the Chinese adaptation of the ALP seems to be guided by regarding the principle as “a
means to an end, not the end by itself”414. For example, while Article 41 of the EIT Law
proclaims the ALP as the guiding standard in transfer pricing adjustments, Article 111 of
the EIT Regulations prescribes “other reasonable methods” that can be used in establishing
the arm’s length price of a transaction. There is also the provision of Article 115 of the EIT
Regulations, which allows the taxpayer’s profit to be assessed on a deemed basis in cases
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where the taxpayer has failed to provide complete information on transfer pricing. These
are some of the Chinese transfer pricing developments that indicate how the ALP, although
formally enacted in China within the framework of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines,
is applied in substance with respect to country’s specific practices.

4.4.4.1

The Issue of Finding Reliable Comparables

The ALP is generally applied by comparing the conditions in transactions between related
parties with conditions in transactions between independent parties in order to determine
whether the prices of these transactions are different. According to the OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines, these comparisons are only useful if the economically relevant
characteristics of the situations being compared are “sufficiently comparable”, i.e., if none
of the differences between the situations being compared substantially affects the
conditions being examined, such as the price or margin, or if precise adjustments can be
made to remove the outcomes of any such differences 415. In this context, China follows the
recommendation made by the OECD Guidelines and requires the performance of a
comparability analysis416 in determining acceptable comparable transactions. Article 22 of
the Circular [2009] No. 2, for example, provides that a comparability analysis should
consider five factors: characteristics of assets transacted or services provided, functions
performed and risks assumed by each party to a transaction, contractual terms and
conditions, economic circumstances, and business strategies417.
As a developing country and an emerging market economy, one of the key challenges for
the SAT and taxpayers in applying the ALP is finding reliable and public information on
comparables as well as comparable independent transactions which are able to satisfy all
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the requirements of the comparability analysis418. Developing and emerging countries
usually have only a small number of public companies419 and the information on domestic
private companies420 can be either inadequate or non-existent421. For this reason, the amount
of publicly available information on domestic companies that can be used for transfer
pricing comparability analysis is limited in China422. As a result, foreign companies –
usually companies in developed countries, where there is a larger number of public
companies – need to be used as substitutes to domestic comparables423. Because of this lack
of information and difficulty in obtaining reliable data, there are no provisions in Chinese
transfer pricing rules prohibiting the use of foreign comparables424. Therefore, tax
authorities and taxpayers are able to select either internal or external comparables
according to which of these can provide a better comparability analysis.
China’s understanding is that substantial comparability adjustments must be done in order
to enable the use of companies in developed countries as comparables for companies in
developing countries425. These adjustments are necessary to eliminate price or profit
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differences attributable to different conditions in the market environment of these
countries:
One of the most common adjustments in China is accounting for differences
in geographic comparability when applying profit-based transfer pricing
methods, such as the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM), to
determine an arm’s length price. For example, when an Asia Pacific set of
companies is used to benchmark the transfer prices of a Chinese taxpayer,
as often being the case, it often includes companies from both developed
countries (such as Japan and Korea), as well as developing countries (such
as Indonesia and Vietnam). Generally speaking, the Asia Pacific set is more
likely to contain companies from developed countries, due to a greater
number of listed companies in those countries and hence there is a greater
volume of publicly available financial information426.
Therefore, China takes the view that there are situations in which geographical market
differences between foreign and domestic comparables will require an appropriate
adjustment to balance the differences. This approach, nevertheless, can create uncertainties
in the Chinese process of establishing the applicable transfer price for a related party
transaction, increasing potential tax disputes between authorities and taxpayers427.

4.4.4.2

Location-Specific Advantages

Location-Specific Advantages (LSAs) are advantages that companies have in their
production arising from assets, resource endowments, government policies or other
incentives that exist in specific localities428. The concept of LSAs, which is not explored in
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the 2010 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines429, can refer to “location savings”, which are
the net costs savings derived by a multinational enterprise when it moves its operations to
a low-cost jurisdiction, such as China and other developing countries, which usually offer
inexpensive rents, transportation, labour and raw materials430. Another concept
encompassed in LSAs refers to “market premium”, i.e., the additional profit earned by a
multinational enterprise that operates in a jurisdiction with unique characteristics that
positively impact on the sale and demand of services or products431.
Tax authorities in China have argued that LSAs – resulting from the country’s unique
market features – deserve proper recognition and compensation through appropriate
transfer prices. In the SAT’s view, due to the low cost and higher selling prices found in
China, a great number of foreign corporations should have higher profit margins because
of location savings and market premiums, particularly in the automotive432, pharmaceutical
and luxury industries433. In order to determine LSAs and their impact on transfer pricing,
Chinese tax authorities follow a four-step approach: 1) identify the existence of a LSA; 2)
determine if the LSA generates additional profits; 3) measure the additional profits
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generated by the LSA; and 4) define the applicable transfer pricing method to allocate the
profits arising from the LSA434.
The concepts of location savings and market premiums have recently been used by the
SAT in its transfer pricing audits:
For instance, a foreign company’s Chinese subsidiary was determined to
adjust its income tax for more than RMB 100 million for 10 years. LSAs
also have been used in self-adjustments, which are similar to transfer pricing
audits although not legally official and conducted by state bureaus. The
SAT has also used LSAs in bilateral APA cases, especially in negotiations
with Japan’s National Tax Authority. Chinese courts have adjudicated very
few transfer pricing cases, and none of them involve LSAs435.
Therefore, since many Chinese LSAs generate high profits that are rightly earned by
Chinese taxpayers, these LSAs are expected to result in profit allocations to Chinese
parties. In this context, Tizhong Liao, Deputy Director General of China’s SAT
International Taxation Department, argues that the world needs to start taking LSAs
seriously as China will continue to apply it in both transfer pricing investigations and
Advanced Pricing Agreements (APAs) negotiations, adding that taxpayers and competent
authorities’ counterparts have been understanding and accepting this concept436.

4.4.4.3

Intangibles

One of the main challenges in the application of the ALP, both for developed and
developing countries437, consists in determining the appropriate transfer price for
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transactions involving intangible property438 transactions. In the case of China, the issue
assumes greater relevance because, as almost all important MNEs currently have
subsidiaries in the country – making China the ‘factory of the world’ – it is common to see
related parties charging excessive royalties and shifting away taxable profits of the Chinese
enterprise439. In this context, the SAT’s understanding is that foreign parent enterprises
usually overprice intangibles provided to its Chinese-related parties and, for this reason,
ensuring that Chinese subsidiaries are appropriately remunerated is one of the SAT’s main
goals440. Article 41 of the EIT Law establishes that:
As regards the costs of an enterprise and its affiliated parties for jointly
developing or accepting intangible assets, or jointly providing or accepting
labour services, they shall, when calculating the taxable income amount,
apportion them according to the arm’s length principle441.
Since intangibles can assume different forms, the SAT recognizes intangible properties for
manufacturing purposes – including manufacturing technologies, technical designs,
production molds, information technologies, various patents and non-patent technologies,
business administration software, commercial secrets and proprietary technologies – and
intangible properties for marketing and sales purposes – including trademarks, brands,
logos, product packaging, customer information and customer relation management442. One
important aspect is that, in order to be recognized by the SAT, intangible property
transactions must be able to create consistent and effective benefits for the transferee
taxpayer443.
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Intangibles, generally in the form of global brand names, technical know-how or business
processes, are commonly provided by MNEs to their Chinese affiliates during the initial
stages of the local operation as a way of helping the establishment of the business in the
country444. However, over time, the Chinese parties gain the skills and experience from
operations in China and may even improve the MNE’s original intangibles445. In such cases,
China understands that, instead of continuing to pay royalties for the parent company,
Chinese affiliates should receive a return on the intangibles that they have developed and
shared with the group companies, being entitled to an additional profit446.
Besides that, in determining whether royalties are deductible or not for a Chinese
enterprise, the SAT performs a ‘contribution-based value creation analysis’. According to
this analysis, royalty payments to non-resident related parties that only have legal
ownership of the intangible property but do not contribute to value creation are not
deductible in computing taxable income447. The idea behind this analysis is that royalties –
the economic benefit arising from the value creation – should reproduce the extent of
contributions made by each related party to the value creation of the intangible property448.

4.4.5

Conclusion

Since their development in 1987, Chinese transfer pricing rules have evolved in a series of
improvements that have produced the current complete transfer pricing system formed by
tax laws, administrative regulations issued by the SAT and tax treaties. However, China’s
mere ‘transplantation’ of the ALP and transfer pricing methodologies established by the
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OECD into its tax system – due to the its lack of experience in dealing with international
transactions after years of closed door policies – has left many of the country’s
particularities unaddressed. China is a large developing country with an emerging economy
and unique market features. This gives rise to singular problems in its international transfer
pricing regulations, which are not addressed by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
Chinese particularities in applying the ALP involve a number of challenges endemic to
developing countries. First, there is a lack of reliable comparables, which is occasioned by
the absence of public information in China regarding domestic comparable transactions.
Because of this difficulty, the SAT and taxpayers need to choose foreign comparables in
order to determine the appropriate arm’s length price or profit; however, in this case,
adjustments are required to eliminate eventual geographical differences. Furthermore,
China provides Location Specific Advantages (LSAs) – location savings and market
premium – and, according to the SAT, the additional profits it generates should be taken
into account in establishing the profits of Chinese affiliates. Finally, China also faces the
challenge of evaluating the contribution of its Chinese companies to intangible transactions
with foreign related companies.

4.5

South Africa

As Africa continues to grow and become more integrated into the global economy,
it is anticipated that more African nations will adopt transfer pricing regulations based on
the ALS. Although transfer pricing regimes in Africa are expected to be based on the OECD
Guidelines and the UN Practical Manual, African governments’ desire to protect revenues
from natural resources will probably influence future transfer pricing legislation449.
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4.5.1

Introduction

During the era of apartheid, South Africa experienced a period of economic, social and
political isolation from the international market, which was reflected in the country’s tax
system and transfer pricing rules. Transfer pricing rules were introduced into the South
African Income Tax Act in 1995 and were revised and updated in 2012. For years, as part
of South Africa’s efforts in integrating its tax system into the international scenario, the
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines were closely followed. However, over time, several
challenges have arisen in the application of South African transfer pricing rules, especially
because, according to its tax authorities, although the OECD guidelines may be useful in
providing an understanding about the ALP, they do not sufficiently respond to practical
issues in the application of the principle450. At present, transfer pricing is a key area for
South African tax authorities and an integral part of the “Compliance Programme”
announced by South Africa’s Minister of Finance451.
This section will analyze how South Africa applies its transfer pricing rules and what are
the main challenges the country faces in following the ALP and the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines. In order to comprehend these concepts, this section will review the historical
background of South African transfer pricing rules, the contemporary regulations on the
subject and the most relevant challenges and peculiarities in its transfer pricing practices.

4.5.2

Historical Background

In the early 1990s, after years of isolation during the apartheid452 period, South Africa reemerged in the international market, experiencing an expansion of its international trade
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and commerce453. Considering that a great share of this international economic activity
occurs between members of multinational enterprises, protecting the South African tax
base from transfer pricing strategies used to transfer profits from South Africa to lower tax
jurisdictions has become a significant concern regarding the country’s wealth and
development. For this reason, in 1994, the “Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects
of the Tax Structure of South Africa” (the Commission) recommended, in its first report,
the introduction of transfer pricing provisions into the South African Income Tax Act454.
Before this period, the manipulation of transfer prices was avoided by rigid exchange
controls; however, with the relaxation of these regulations, the Commission envisaged a
negative effect on the South African tax base455. The Commission also recommended that
South Africa should follow the international consensus in the application of the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. According to the Commission, since the Guidelines were the
common language among a relevant group of trading and investment countries, following
them would be useful in helping South Africa to integrate its tax system into the
international scenario456.
Therefore, in 1995, transfer pricing rules were introduced into the South African Income
Tax Act and, until 2012, when Nigeria implemented its transfer pricing system, South
Africa was the only African country with a comprehensive transfer pricing system in
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practice457. The enactment of Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, which covered both
transfer pricing and thin capitalization regulations, allowed the adjustments of transaction
prices for tax purposes based on the ALP458. This legislation was considered “discretionary
in nature” and did not provide detailed assistance in the application of the ALP460. For this
reason, the South African Revenue Service (SARS)462 published in 1999 the Practice Note
no. 7463 establishing the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as the transfer pricing standard
in interpreting the application of the ALP464:
Because of the international importance of the OECD Guidelines, this
Practice Note is based on, inter alia, those guidelines. Although South
Africa is not a member country of the OECD, the OECD Guidelines are
acknowledged as an important, influential document that reflects
unanimous agreement amongst the member countries, reached after an
extensive process of consultation with industry and tax practitioners in
many countries. The OECD Guidelines are also followed by many countries
which are not OECD members and are therefore becoming a globally
accepted standard. […] The OECD Guidelines should be followed in the

457

Johann Hattingh, “South Africa” in Yariv Brauner and Pasquale Pistone, eds, BRICS and the
Emergence of International Tax Coordination (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2015) 234 at 256 [Hattingh,
“South Africa”].
458
Income Tax Act, South Africa 1962, Section 31.
460
Hattingh, “South Africa”, supra note 443 at 255.
462
The SARS is South Africa’s tax collection authority. According to the South African Revenue
Service Act 34 of 1997, the SARS is an autonomous agency – it was established as an “organ of
state within the public administration, but as an institution outside the public service” – which is
responsible for the administration of the country’s tax system and customs service. South African
Revenue Service Act no. 34, South Africa 1997, Part 1.
463
The SARS usually publishes Practice Notes that provide guidance on their interpretation and
practical application of the Income Tax Act. Corrick, supra note 440 at 800.
464
Hattingh, “South Africa”, supra note 443 at 255.

116

absence of specific guidance in terms of this Practice Note, the provisions
of section 31 or the tax treaties entered into by South Africa466.
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines were rigorously followed during the first years of
the South African transfer pricing system467. Nevertheless, over time, the practical
application of the ALP according to the OECD guidelines as well as the discretionary
nature of the domestic legislation generated several issues in the enforcement of South
Africa’s transfer pricing rules468. These developments resulted in some changes in South
Africa’s transfer pricing legislation, which – through an amended version of Section 31 of
the Income Tax Act that became effective after January 2013 – had its scope broadened,
becoming more aligned to Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention469.

4.5.3

Transfer Pricing Rules in South Africa

South Africa’s current relevant transfer pricing law is in Section 31 of the Income Tax Act.
The Section provides terminology definitions necessary to its application, including the
meanings of goods, services and international agreements. Additional transfer pricing
sources include SARS’ Practice Note no. 7, which was issued to establish guidelines
regarding the procedures to be followed in the determination arm’s length prices, taking
into account the South African business environment, and to publish the views of the SARS
on practical issues in dealing with transfer prices470.
Since Practice Note no. 7 was drafted as a practical guide, it is not intended to be a
prescriptive or exhaustive discussion of every transfer pricing issue neither to override
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provisions of the Income Tax Act, when properly interpreted471. Also, according to the
South African Constitution, which provides in Section 232 that “customary international
law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the constitution of an act of
Parliament”472, customary international law may also be applied in transfer pricing cases.

4.5.3.1

The arm’s Length Principle

South African transfer pricing rules adopt the ALP as the standard for determining the
prices of cross-border transactions entered into by its residents473. In this context, according
to Section 31.1, where any transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding
falls within the further explored concept of “affected transaction” and results in any tax
benefit, the taxable income must be calculated as if the transaction had been entered into
according to the terms and conditions that would exist between independent parties dealing
at arm’s length474.
Therefore, when taxpayers enter into transactions with connected persons outside South
Africa on terms or conditions that are not in accordance to the ALP and obtain a tax benefit
from such terms or conditions, they are required to adjust their taxable income.

4.5.3.2

The Concept of Affected Transactions and Connected
Persons

South Africa’s transfer pricing provisions are applied to affected transactions, meaning any
transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding that: a) have been entered into
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between a resident and non-resident connected person, or between non-resident connected
persons where either has a permanent establishment in the country, or between two resident
persons where either has a permanent establishment outside the country to which the
transaction is related475 and b) “where any term or condition of that transaction, operation,
scheme, agreement or understanding is different from any term or condition that would
have existed had those persons been independent persons dealing at arm’s length”476. In
this context, a connected person in relation to a company, as defined in Section 1 of the
Income Tax Act, is:
a) any other company that forms part of the same group of two or more
companies in which one company directly or indirectly holds shares in at
least one other company with the effect that more than 50% of the shares of
each controlled group are directly held by the controlling group company,
one or more controlled group companies or any combination thereof and the
controlling group companies or any combination thereof and the controlling
group company directly hold more than 50% of the shares in at least one
controlled group; b) any other company with a minimum 20% holding in
the equity share capital in the company; c) any person, excluding a
company, who individually or jointly with a connected person directly or
indirectly holds at least 20% of the company’s equity share capital or voting
rights; or d) a company managed or controlled by connected persons of the
company477.

4.5.3.3

Transfer Pricing Methods

South Africa’s transfer pricing law does not explicitly provide any transfer pricing
methodologies. Therefore, taxpayers and tax authorities rely on the SARS’ Practice Note
no. 7, which incorporates the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, prescribing the following
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methods: a) the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method; b) the resale price method;
c) the cost plus method; d) the transactional net margin (TNMM) method; and e) the profit
split method478. Nevertheless, since Practice Note no. 7 does not constitute law, the SARS’s
Commissioner has to take into consideration the facts of each case individually in order to
determine whether an arm’s length price has been applied479.
In order to select the most appropriate method, i.e., the method resulting in the maximum
level of comparability and the least necessity of adjustments, it is indispensable to perform
an analysis of the facts of each case, taking into account the availability of reliable data480.
Although Practice Note no. 7 does not prescribe a hierarchy of transfer pricing methods to
be applied, the CUP method is preferred over the other methods481.

4.5.4

Peculiarities and Challenges in South Africa’s Transfer Pricing
Practices

The key principle underpinning South African transfer pricing law is the arm’s length
standard as established in Article 9 of both the UN Model Treaty and the OECD Model
Treaty. Nevertheless, the application of the ALP in South Africa has presented some
challenges since its inception. Indeed, South Africa is one of the five countries, including
Brazil, China and India, that informed its transfer pricing practices – focusing on its
challenges and particularities – in the 2017 version of the UN Practical Manual on Transfer
Pricing for Developing Countries482. Additionally, in regards to its tax treaty network,
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South Africa has reservations in Article 9(2), reserving the right to making corresponding
arm’s length adjustments non-compulsory483.

4.5.4.1

Challenges in Finding Reliable Comparables

One of the main challenges in South Africa’s transfer pricing practice is the difficulty in
finding domestic reliable comparables. In this sense, South African transfer pricing
officials argue that they lack the data on comparables necessary to complete an appropriate
transfer pricing analysis484. Therefore, since databases containing South African or even
African specific comparable data are not available, taxpayers and tax authorities have to
use foreign comparables – mostly from European databases – to determine arm’s length
levels of profitability485.
In order to account for geographical differences (for instance, market, economic or political
differences) and improve the degree of reliability of the comparable data, the SARS usually
attempts to perform comparability adjustments486. For example, the SARS has made
country-risk adjustments based on publicly available ratings and government bond rates;
nonetheless, the SARS recognize that this analysis is often complex and, for this reason,
comparability adjustments are applied with caution and only in certain circumstances487.
Because of this lack of reliable comparables, South Africa adopts a more holistic approach
in determining whether or not the ALP has been followed by taxpayers488. According to
this holistic approach, instead of just considering the comparable data and not taking into
considerations other relevant commercial factors, the SARS attempts to understand the
“business model of taxpayers across the whole value chain, gaining an in-depth
understanding of the commercial sensibilities and rationalities governing intra-group
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transactions and agreements” in order to establish the appropriate arm’s length level of
profit489.
As it is the case in India490, risk also plays an important role in the comparability analysis
performed by South African tax authorities. Foreign parent companies, when comparing
the higher profits earned in South Africa to comparable companies in other markets, do not
take into account the actual functional and risk profile of the South African subsidiary and,
therefore, are increasingly shifting profits via year-end adjustments to bring the South
African subsidiary in line with comparable companies491. In this respect, South African
transfer pricing administration has also noted that there appears to be an increasing
tendency for South African subsidiaries to be classified as limited risk distributors or
limited risk manufacturers, when, in reality, these companies assume considerable risks in
performing their activities492.

4.5.4.2

Location-Specific Advantages

In many circumstances, the South African market, as it happens with the other BRICS
countries, has unique features that enable South African subsidiaries to earn higher profits
than comparable data from foreign databases would suggest or than their related party
partners earn in other parts of the world. One example is the South African pharmaceutical
industry, which is still not saturated and, as a result, offers significant opportunities for
MNEs to obtain higher profits493. Furthermore, South Africa has been experiencing
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increasing participation and spending power of the middle class segment of its economy,
which also provides important market opportunities for MNEs494.
The South African approach regarding LSAs is still being developed by the country’s tax
authorities:
Building on the practice followed in India and China, SARS is currently
considering its approach to location savings, location specific advantages
and market premiums within certain industries and those factors will be
addressed when conducting audits495.

4.5.4.3

Intangibles

Because of its unique nature, intangibles present a series of challenges for South Africa’s
transfer pricing administration496. South Africa experiences disputes regarding the
existence of local marketing intangibles, cases involving economic versus legal ownership
and also the valuation of intangible property497.
South African transfer pricing rules involving intangibles are applied in conjunction with
the country’s exchange control rules. In this context, royalties payable by a South African
enterprise to a foreign related party must be approved under the exchange control rules498.
Furthermore, in comparison to the rest of the world, there is one relevant particularity in
the treatment of transfer prices of intangibles in South Africa: the country’s exchange
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control regulations prohibit the relicensing of intangible property back into South Africa499.
Accordingly, once the intangible assets are sold to a foreign related party, the latter
becomes its legal owner, licensing the intangible property worldwide (except for South
Africa) and earning royalties as compensation500. This peculiarity generally inhibits the
potential for transactions involving transfers of intangibles as those described in the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
The restrictions in South Africa’s exchange control regulations often allow a royalty rate
regarding manufacturing royalties lower than the rates usually considered to be in
accordance to the ALP in global transfer pricing studies of MNEs501. Besides that, one of
the main transfer pricing strategies used by MNEs – the transfer of valuable intangible
property to a low tax jurisdiction in order to ensure a flow of royalty income to that
jurisdiction – is, to a great extent, prevented by South African rules because there are
punitive tax consequences for South African taxpayers who pay royalties that were
previously owned by them502.

4.5.5

Conclusion

Transfer pricing is an area that is to be under a “policy flux”503 in South Africa. Initially,
the country completely followed the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines; however, in
recent years, some fundamental aspects of the OECD standards are being questioned in
South African transfer pricing practices. These include the practical application of the
concept of comparability and its feasibility in an African context as well as deviations
replacing the traditional ALP for a more subjective and holistic approach.
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Chapter 5

5

BRICS: Potential for Cooperation

The grouping of the BRICS countries as an informal association of emerging economies in
the beginning of the 21st century was a response to the rapid growth of these countries and
to the misbalance of power in global politics and economics. In recent years, the
involvement of the BRICS in international organizations and leading informal unions, as
well as their growing economic power, have elevated their political and economic
significance. This allowed possibilities of cooperation between the BRICS in favor of new
international tax and transfer pricing policies:
On transfer pricing, the BRICS assume a particular relevance instead of the
developing countries. The latter cannot be considered an influential player
either in defining the set of rules for transfer pricing, nor in choosing policymaker leader(s), basically because it is more a residence than source country
topic. Instead, the BRICS, because of their strong economies and attractive
investment opportunities, are moving from being developing to developed
economies and over the last years they have acquired enough status to
influence matters in transfer pricing and to justify their presence in the
OECD discussions504.
Nevertheless, considering the differences between the BRICS countries’ economies, tax
systems and international tax policies, there is no clear evidence demonstrating how these
countries are organizing themselves in order to influence the international transfer pricing
landscape. Therefore, this chapter considers the potential for cooperation between the
BRICS and how they may influence or provide solutions for the problems experienced by
emerging economies in applying the ALP and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The
chapter is organized in three sections, which analyze the convergence and divergence
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aspects present in the BRICS transfer pricing legislations; the impact and influence the
BRICS have on international organizations, particularly the UN and the OECD; and the
limits these countries face in their role of shaping the international transfer pricing scenario.

5.1 Points of Convergence and Divergence in the BRICS
Transfer Pricing Policies
The BRICS, as most countries with transfer pricing regimes in force, have adopted – at
least formally – the ALP as the standard method to allocate income originating from
transactions between related parties. Nevertheless, the BRICS countries have different
approaches when it comes to pragmatically interpreting and applying the theory of the ALP
designed by the OECD in their domestic transfer pricing systems.
Brazil
The Brazilian transfer pricing rules, established in 1997, have the most distinctive approach
in determining the prices of cross-border transactions between related parties505. Brazil’s
transfer pricing law includes only the CUP method, the cost-plus method and resale price
method, excluding the profit-based methods recommended in the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines and adopted by other BRICS countries. In addition, in order to facilitate the
application of the ALP in regard to the cost-plus and resale price methods, Brazil applies a
system of predetermined profit margins and formulas, in which taxpayers are allowed to
present counterproof when the predetermined margins diverge from the margins practiced
between independent parties.
Russia
Russia’s first transfer pricing legislation – in force from 1999 until 2011 – was only applied
if the transfer prices deviated more than 20% from the prices practiced between unrelated
parties. However, in 2012, Russia revised its transfer pricing rules and currently follows
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the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines506. Contrary to Brazil, Russia seems to be the
BRICS member with the transfer pricing system most aligned with the OECD standards.
Although the country’s transfer pricing legislation diverged in some aspects from the
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines507, Russian tax authorities are not as concerned about
these peculiarities as the other BRICS representatives508. Russian compliance with OECD’s
transfer pricing policies are related to the country’s interest in becoming a member of the
organization. Indeed, Russia has made an official request for the OECD membership in
1996 and, in 2007, the OECD Council at Ministerial level adopted a resolution to open
discussions concerning the country’s accession509.
India
Indian transfer pricing legislation, introduced in 2001, follows the arm’s length standard
and is generally consistent with the approach recommended by the OECD, including all
the methods prescribed in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines510. Nevertheless, India
argues that the OECD transfer pricing approach does not effectively considers specific
market circumstances of the country, such as location savings realized in India or the actual
risks borne by local Indian subsidiaries.
China
The transfer pricing legislation in China follows the ALP and the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines methods, including other reasonable methods when necessary511. As it is the
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case in India, Chinese tax authorities also understand that the OECD approach is not
completely adequate to the country’s peculiarities. China argues, for instance, that locationspecific advantages – location savings and market premiums – should be taken into account
when determining the arm’s length price of a related party transaction. Another Chinese
particularity in applying the ALP is the difficulty in finding reliable comparables,
especially because of the lack of public information regarding domestic comparable
transactions.
South Africa
South Africa, which enacted its transfer pricing rules in 1995 and then revised in 2013,
follows the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, as elucidated in a South African Revenue
Service practice note issued in 1999512. Although having recent transfer pricing legislation,
South Africa’s experience with the application of the ALP aligns with the transfer pricing
challenges encountered by other BRICS countries. These challenges include locationspecific advantages as well as the lack of domestic reliable comparables and the consequent
difficulty in performing an effective comparability analysis. This leads to the application
of a more subjective and holistic approach by South African tax authorities.
Therefore, although all the BRICS have adopted transfer pricing rules in their domestic
legislation that, at least theoretically follow the ALP, the application of these rules
according to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines present pragmatic challenges for them,
specifically for Brazil, India, China and South Africa. These challenges and the BRICS
countries’ practices regarding them are compared and analyzed in the next sections.

5.1.1

Lack of Reliable Comparables: A Common Difficulty with
Distinctive Solutions

Some of these challenges, such as the difficulty in finding local reliable comparables, are
not particular to only one member of the BRICS. Brazil, China and South Africa have all
manifested problems in this respect, demonstrating concerns with the availability and
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quality of domestic information regarding transactions between independent parties that
can be used for comparisons. However, the treatment each of these countries gives to the
lack of reliable comparables is completely different.
While Brazil has focused on a more pragmatic transfer pricing system with the use of
predetermined margins, South Africa tax authorities have opted for a more holistic
approach in determining the appropriate transfer price of transactions between related
parties. The Chinese transfer pricing policies concerning the lack of local comparables, on
the other hand, seem to be the more aligned with the ALP, having influenced international
initiatives related to the issue. In June 2017, the Platform for Collaboration on Tax (PCT),
a joint initiative of the IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank Group – has developed a “Toolkit
for Addressing Difficulties in Accessing Comparables Data for Transfer Pricing
Analyses”. This toolkit recommends Chinese practices, such as using geographic proximity
as a criterion in the selection of foreign comparables513 or adjusting for differences in
geographic market, are recommended for other tax administrations514.

5.1.2

Location-Specific Advantages, Location Savings and Market
Premium: A Shared Concern Among China and India

The concept of location-specific advantages (LSAs) – which, in the last years, acquired a
central position in the transfer pricing debate mainly due to the increasing foreign direct
investments in emerging economies515 – has assumed particular importance in India and
China. The basic idea behind LSAs is that investments made by MNEs in these countries,
because of their unique market features, such as inexpensive and skilled labour force,
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access to large consumer markets, cost savings and incentives, are more profitable than the
same investments in other countries.
The tax authorities of China and India manifested their positions on LSAs in the UN
Practical Manual516, raising awareness to LSAs as important aspects that should be
considered when carrying out comparability analysis in transfer pricing audits. According
to these countries, a portion of the LSAs should accrue to the Chinese and India entities
and be subjected to tax there. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, on the other hand,
provide examples that, although acknowledging the existence of LSAs in MNEs
operations, argue that the entity that has the bargaining power is the one that should be able
to claim the LSAs517.

5.1.3

Intangibles and Risks

As discussed in Chapter 2, the application of the ALP involves a comparability analysis
that takes into account functions, assets and risks. Nevertheless, intangible assets and risks
are easier to move than functions and tangible assets, which gives MNEs the opportunity
to use artificially shift them to jurisdictions where they will receive a more favourable tax
treatment518. Dealing with intangibles and risks in a transfer pricing context is a complex
issue not only for developing and emerging economies but for developed countries as well.
However, China and India express particular concerns with the fact that MNEs often shift
the profits made in these countries to other jurisdictions by characterizing their Chinese
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and Indian subsidiaries as utilizing foreign-owned intellectual property, on which they have
to pay royalties.

5.1.4

Formulary Apportionment

Even though practices in some of the BRICS countries are undermining the idea that there
is an international consensus on the ALP and on its traditional application, these countries
do not go as far as to support a purely global formulary apportionment approach as an
alternative to the arm’s length standard. None of the BRICS countries have incorporated
the formulary apportionment system into their tax treaties or domestic transfer pricing
legislations519. China, for example, joined the OECD in advising against a change from the
ALP to formulary apportionment in the BEPS Action Plan520. The motive for this Chinese
position is that the country anticipates huge complications in choosing an acceptable global
allocation formula and in implementing the formulary apportionment in practice521.
Some of the reasons for the non-adoption of the formulary apportionment system include
the difficulty to find consensus in the international level about the criteria to be used for
the apportionment and, particularly for the BRICS, there is no evidence that this
methodology would be more favourable, considering the lower values that a potential
formula would assign to emerging economies522. On the other hand, it is argued that
formulary apportionment, besides being easier and cheaper to administer, avoids the
allocation of income to tax havens as no income would be apportioned to haven intangibles
holding companies under a formula mainly based on sales (there is no market in tax
havens)523.
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5.2 The Impact and Influence of the BRICS on Supranational
Tax Bodies
The BRICS individual positions and advocacy on particular transfer pricing issues have
influenced the public discussions on international tax and transfer pricing policies,
including the works of supranational tax bodies, such as the UN and the OECD524. This
section reviews how this influence has been reflected in the works of the UN Committee
of Tax Experts in International Tax Matters and in the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative.

5.2.1

BRICS and the works of the UN Committee of Tax Experts in
International Tax Matters and the UN Subcommittee on
Transfer Pricing

The UN Committee of Tax Experts in International Tax Matters (“UN Tax Committee”) is
composed by 25 members – designated by governments but acting in their expert personal
capacity – appointed by the Secretary General in accordance with an equitable
geographical distribution and representing different tax systems525. The main difference
between the UN Tax Committee and the OECD Fiscal Committee is that, as opposed to
the latter, the UN does not recommend that all members use the UN Model as well as
interpret and apply their treaties following the Group of Experts commentaries526.
The BRICS527 are influential countries in the context of the UN Tax Committee, having
constantly emphasized the necessity to adapt OECD international tax standards to the
peculiarities and needs of less developed and developing countries528. Although the BRICS
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are gradually moving from a pure capital-importing position to a net capital exporter
position, the inflow of foreign direct investment is still crucial for them and, for this reason,
the BRICS generally recognize the UN Model Convention and Commentaries as a “starting
point strengthening source state jurisdiction”529. The UN Tax Committee and its meetings,
therefore, are a relevant platform for the BRICS countries as they are able to use their
representatives to influence the UN work according to their international tax and transfer
pricing policies, especially considering that there is a limited number of representatives
from other developing countries that can attend the meetings and that these representatives
can support the BRICS positions530. In addition, the UN is an international organization in
which all countries in the world are members and the documents and publications it issues
can attract the attention from the tax world, playing an important role in subsequent
discussions on international tax issues531.
Transfer pricing is one of the core international tax areas where the BRICS and other
developing countries pressure the UN to diverge from the OECD traditional standards:
The peculiarities of the UN Model vis-à-vis the OECD Model are somehow
quite relevant, and have resulted not only in the establishment of a specific
divergent clause in the text of the UN Model (specifically, article 9(3), but
also in the formulation of the UN Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for
Developing Countries in 2013, as a result of the work done by the
Subcommittee on Transfer Pricing – Practical Issues532.
The UN Practical Manual establishes guidance to developing countries and helps them in
dealing with peculiar problems when applying the ALP to transfer pricing transactions.
There is an agreement between the members of the UN Subcommittee on Transfer Pricing
that the UN Practical Manual is not intended to depart from the international consensus
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and from the framework established in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines533. This idea
is followed throughout most part of the UN Practical Manual; however, in the last part of
the document (in the 2012 version, Chapter 10 and, in the 2017 version, Part D), the tax
authorities of Brazil, China, India and South Africa have had the opportunity to present
their national perspectives regarding the transfer pricing challenges and the practical
solutions adopted by them534. These positions – which deviate in some forms from OECD
considerations on the application of the ALP – do not necessarily reflected a consensus
among the UN Subcommittee.
According to Jan de Goede, who has been personally involved in the work of the UN as an
IBFD (International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation) Senior Principal, “this area [transfer
pricing] is the one where the BRICS countries present at the [UN Subcommittee on
Transfer Pricing] operated in support of each other, even though their individual positions
are not fully aligned”535. Indeed, although the UN emphasizes that the last part of the
manual refers merely to the countries’ practices and experiences, the BRICS effectively
used this space to outline their transfer pricing policies for countering MNEs’ strategies to
have value not taxed in the country where it was created. Some of these transfer pricing
policies were included in the BEPS measures, as discussed in Section 5.2.2.
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The BRICS countries participation in UN Tax Committee and in the UN Subcommittee on
Transfer Pricing shows that these countries have supported each other in having their
positions considered and reproduced in the works of the UN. This mutual support was
given even on matters where there was no common agreement between the BRICS
regarding the individual tax policies taken by each one of them. The most notable example
is the UN Practical Manual, where, even though the individual transfer pricing policies and
methodologies of the BRICS countries were diverse, they all supported and contributed to
the inclusion of a new chapter in the manual laying out their practices.

5.2.2

BRICS and the BEPS Project

Given the structure of the OECD, the organization’s initiatives are predominantly
developed by representatives of its member countries. In the case of the BEPS project, in
response to previous criticisms regarding the legitimacy of the OECD – as a body with
exclusive membership – in articulating global consensus concerning international tax
policy rules, selected non-member countries were invited to participate in developing the
initiative536. The OECD members also have a strong interest in the inclusion of the BRICS
and other developing countries in the BEPS initiative because, if these countries were not
engaged in the project, the suggested anti-BEPS measures effectiveness would not be
guaranteed, possibly leading to the relocation of MNEs to countries where the measures
were not adopted537.
The BRICS countries also have a strong interest in participating in the BEPS project,
considering that base erosion and profit shifting are significant issues for their economies.
In India, for instance, the analysis of case law suggests that base erosion usually occurs
because of the distribution of taxing rights in favor of residence countries. In China, BEPS
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practices are considered by the SAT as major threats for the country’s tax administration538.
Since BEPS refers to shifting profits from countries where the business activities occur to
low-tax jurisdictions, China – as a major producer of goods and market for goods and
services with a corporate income tax rate of 25% – is believed by some to be one of the
main victims of BEPS539.
More than that, for the BRICS countries, the BEPS project represents an opportunity for
reforming the existent international tax system, including the transfer pricing area. As
discussed in Chapter 4, the BRICS have developed their transfer pricing legislations quite
late in comparison with other developed economies and, most of them, had to enact
domestic laws that did not deviate from the international norms, resulting in a mere implant
of international standards to their domestic laws. These international transfer pricing
norms, as established by the OECD member countries, have demonstrated to be inadequate
for countries in different stages of development, such as the BRICS. For this reason, the
BRICS – which were not involved in the decision-making process of the current
international tax regime – see the BEPS initiative as an important opportunity to exert their
influence regarding the matters that are significant for them540.
As members of the G20, the BRICS contributed to putting BEPS on the global agenda.
Also, the BRICS countries have been invited to participate in the Committee on Fiscal
Affairs541 and in the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax
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Purposes, being active contributors to these initiatives. For example, China’s tax
administration representatives, until 2015, had attended 42 BEPS meetings, submitted 52
position papers to the OECD and made several other contributions to the project542.
With respect to transfer pricing, the BEPS initiative has started as a challenge to the
complete dominance of the arm’s length standard, recognizing the necessity of using other
methods in cases where an arm’s length valuation is unmanageable. Although the ALP is
still seen by the OECD as a practical and balanced standard for tax administrations and
taxpayers to evaluate transfer prices, the way the OECD is moving towards transactional
methods – accepting the profit split method as an appropriate method for intangibles – is
consistent with the BRICS desire for a simpler transfer pricing system.
More specifically, the influence of the BRICS on the BEPS initiative is evidenced by the
inclusion of location savings and specific market advantages in Action 8 Final Report,
according to which “difficult issues can arise in evaluating the differences between
geographic markets and in determining appropriate comparability adjustments. Such issues
may arise in connection with the consideration of cost savings attributable to operating in
a particular market […] (location savings). In other situations comparability issues can
arise in connection with […] local market advantages or disadvantages”543. The following
guidance on the treatment of location savings given by BEPS Action 8 is generally in
accordance with the Chinese and Indian perspectives544 on the issue:
In determining how location savings are to be shared between two or more
associated enterprises, it is necessary to consider (i) whether location
savings exist; (ii) the amount of any location savings; (iii) the extent to
which location savings are either retained by a member or members of the
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MNE group or are passed on to independent customers or suppliers; and
(iv) where location savings are not fully passed on to independent customers
or suppliers, the manner in which independent enterprises operating under
similar circumstances would allocate any retained net location savings.
Where the functional analysis shows that location savings exist that are not
passed on to customers or suppliers, and where comparable entities and
transactions in the local market can be identified, those local market
comparables will provide the most reliable indication regarding how the net
location savings should be allocated […] When reliable local market
comparables are not present, determinations regarding the existence and
allocation of location savings among members of an MNE group, and any
comparability adjustments required to take into account location savings,
should be based on an analysis of all of the relevant facts and circumstances,
including the functions performed, risks assumed, and assets used of the
relevant associated enterprises545.
The BEPS initiative emphasis on the value creation of intangibles, as articulated in Action
8, is also in line with the BRICS – more specifically China and India – transfer pricing
approach. The BEPS Final Report new guidance demands a careful analysis of the actual
transaction between the related parties, by analyzing not only the contractual relations
between them, but also their conduct, through an examination of the functions performed,
assets used and risks assumed546. According to this revised guidance, the conduct of the
related parties will supplement the contractual arrangements (if they are incomplete) or
even replace them (when they are not supported by the conduct)547. This approach was
already applied by Chinese tax authorities, which, when assessing the deduction of intragroup royalties, performed a contribution-based value creation analysis548. Likewise,
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Indian transfer pricing rules also emphasize the conduct of the related parties rather than
their contractual arrangements, especially regarding the allocation of risks.
Another influential transfer pricing position from the BRICS can be found in the BEPS
revised guidance on the application of the CUP method, usually appropriate for
determining the prices of commodity transactions. This new guidance states that quoted
prices – such as those from a commodity exchange market – may be useful in establishing
arm’s length prices of related parties’ transactions. This practice has already been applied
in Brazil, where it consists in specific transfer pricing methods for import transactions (PCI
method)549 and export transactions (PECEX method)550.
Therefore, important outcomes of the BEPS project regarding transfer pricing have been
influenced by the participation of the BRICS countries in this initiative. The BRICS
contributions to the BEPS initiative illustrate what these countries can realistically achieve
at a global level. It is important to emphasize that the scope of the BEPS initiative was not
to redesign all the basic international tax principles. Thus, the international tax regime
continues to be biased in favor of developed capital exporting countries551. Also, the
“possibilities for non-OECD countries to participate in the decision-making process on
anti-BEPS measures have been limited and rarely acted on […] they [non-OECD countries]
seem to serve the interests of OECD countries, rather than those of non-OECD
countries”552.
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Nevertheless, the BEPS initiative represents the beginning of a discussion process that
involves countries other than the OECD members and, to the extent that this initiative is
reforming the existent transfer pricing regime, the BRICS are actively involved.

5.2.2.1

BRICS Memorandum of Cooperation on Tax Matters

In July 2017, the BRICS signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on Tax Matters (MoC)
between their tax authorities as a recognition of the “significance of strengthening
multilateral tax cooperation for BRICS countries in order to improve tax compliance and
protect [their] tax base”553. The MoC aims to promote cooperation between the BRICS tax
administrations on identified common areas of interest regarding tax matters. In this
respect, the BRICS have reached the understanding of coordinating their positions on
priority work of the G20 tax agenda, including the implementation of the standards of the
BEPS initiative and improving their collective involvement in international tax issues
under the framework of the UN554.
The MoC prescribes the cooperation between the BRICS countries on capacity building by
organizing expert visits between them in the form of seminars or workshops on
international tax matters555. Within the available resources, the BRICS will also cooperate
in providing technical assistance to developing countries.556
Furthermore, the MoC reaffirms the BRICS countries’ support for the BEPS initiative. In
a Communiqué issued after the BRICS meeting on 27 July 2017, the BRICS affirmed they
“remain committed to the facilitation of economic growth, as well as the timely, consistent
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and widespread implementation of the BEPS project outcomes and call upon all relevant
jurisdictions to join the inclusive framework on BEPS on an equal footing”557.

5.2.3

The Roles of the BRICS as Norm Takers and Norm Makers

A considerable part of the literature relating to state influence over, or acceptance of, global
governance arrangements describe states in simple and dyadic terms, labeling them as
either norm makers – by imposing or playing an essential role in the norms that regulate a
global governance issue area – or norm takers – by accepting the existing norms regulating
a certain area or accepting norms proposed by other states558. European countries and the
United States have usually been regarded as norm makers, or normative leaders; on the
other hand, developing countries – including emerging economies – because they were
socialized into an existing world order, have typically been seen as norm takers559.
Nevertheless, with the rise of the BRICS countries in the 21st century, some authors now
see these emerging economies in a position to be norm makers, particularly because of the
economic relevance these countries assumed due to their growth, market size and regional
influence560. Indeed, one of the shared characteristics among the BRICS is their aspiration
to become norm makers instead of norm takers, challenging the dominant states at the
center of global decision making and acting as a revisionist power within global economic
governance561.
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In respect to the role of the BRICS as norm makers in the international tax regime, it is
possible to note a critical attitude among the members of the group towards standard tax
policies:
The BRICS do not approach tax policy formation (including the negotiation
of treaties) from the perspective of consumers satisfied with the off-theshelf, standard version of tax policy. They think critically about their needs,
they review the models and guidance currently available and then they mix
and match and innovate to the extent that their considerable negotiating
power permits562.
Acknowledging the BRICS as norm makers, however, does not mean that these countries
would be able to transform the existing international tax regime, eliminating all the transfer
pricing policies that are not convenient for them. Nor does it imply that the BRICS
countries would dismiss all the tax policies designed by supranational tax bodies, such as
the OECD and the UN563. The role of the BRICS as norm makers is rather an indication of
how these countries have developed their unique international tax policies on certain
matters that are important for them, such as transfer pricing.
Brazil, for instance, has demonstrated resistance to being a norm taker in respect to the
traditional arm’s length approach to transfer pricing established by the OECD in its
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Having adopted transfer pricing rules where predetermined
profit margins are used in the cost-plus and resale price methods, the country has developed
a transfer pricing system that is a “conciliation between the arm’s length standard and the
practicability needs”564. However, even though Brazil departed from the traditional OECD
arm’s length standard, the country manages to reconcile its unique approach with its tax
treaty network, which include article 9(1) of the OECD Model Treaty. The Brazilian
understanding is that the country’s transfer pricing legislation is compatible with the ALP
and, as a consequence, with Brazil’s responsibilities under its tax treaties.
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The Brazilian transfer pricing treatment illustrates how the BRICS may perform their role
as norm makers in the international tax regime. Brazil has had enough authority to design
and enforce a domestic transfer pricing system that – although significantly different from
the dominant transfer pricing regime – is regarded by the country’s tax administration as a
more pragmatic and effective approach for an emerging economy reality. On the other
hand, Brazil has not completely disregarded the ALP or the OECD’s influence on the
international tax regime: the country’s tax treaties incorporate article 9(1) of the OECD
Model Treaty and meet the ALP requirements in its transfer pricing law by allowing
taxpayers, under certain circumstances, to use different profit margins than those
established by the law.
Resistance to merely accepting the OECD’s approach to transfer pricing was also
expressed by India, which, in 2012, published a letter criticizing the OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines and, essentially, emphasizing how these guidelines were prejudicial for
developing (source) countries565. According to David Spencer, “the letter represented a
seminal event, as it was the first significant argument by a major developing country
against the Guidelines566”. The Indian role as a norm maker is further explained by Lee
Sheppard:
India is only an observer at the OECD, but its influence on the development
and interpretation of treaties cannot be underestimated. India regards the
OECD model commentary as a mere recommendation and the 1995 OECD
transfer pricing guidelines as a document that takes care of the interests of
developed (read capital-exporting) countries at the expense of the taxing
rights of developing countries. India has lobbied the U.N. Financing and
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Development Office to devalue the guidelines as guidance for article 9 of
the U.N. model treaty567.
Correspondingly, as examined above, the participation of Brazil, India, China and South
Africa in the UN Practical Manual provided “an ‘end run’ around the OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines”568.

5.3
Limits and Possibilities on the BRICS Role in
Shaping the International Transfer Pricing Landscape
The BRICS have been recognized as a relevant group in the tax community. As discussed
in the previous sections, the grouping of the BRICS countries and their relevance in the
international transfer pricing scenario derives mainly from their economic power and status
as emerging economies. Moreover, the BRICS have common features and international tax
practices that support them as a coalition seeking to shift the balance of global political
influence towards the developing world569.
Nevertheless, the BRICS also have significant historical, social, economic, geographic and
political dissimilarities that challenge their performance as a unified group, which may
reduce their impact on possible international tax and transfer pricing policy reforms. In a
study conducted by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) on the impact of
emerging economies on global governance, an analysis of the BRICS countries emphasized
their differences as a significant barrier for their cooperation as a group:
While cooperation between the BRICS countries is increasing, differences
between them remain large as well. These differences include economic
structure, level of economic development, external and internal security
situation, level of democracy and so on. They create substantial barriers for
finding true common ground and often limit cooperation among the BRICS

567

Sheppard, supra note 506 at 468.
Feinschreiber and Kent, supra note 467.
569
Nikonov, supra note 141.
568

145

on many issues. The absence of a broadly shared positive agenda is the main
reason why it is highly unlikely for these countries to grow into a geoeconomic, geopolitical alternative to the West within the next five to ten
years570.
Some authors argue that, having not much in common – and, in fact, having a great deal of
rivalry between them – all the BRICS countries share is the challenge to Western
hegemony571. Analyzing the uniqueness of the BRICS countries through a Brazilian
perspective, Luís Schoueri argues that “the idiosyncrasies of the Brazilian tax environment
mean that it may have different positions than the other BRICS countries. However, the
BRICS countries may have common needs and claims that are not currently represented in
the OECD”572. In this sense, assuming that these differences with the OECD are the main
connection between the BRICS, the question that arise is whether this is a sufficient tie to
unite these countries and their international tax policies.
In the international transfer pricing area, considering that nearly all of the BRICS countries
are becoming, or at least aspire to become capital exporter countries, their adoption of
policies associated with residence jurisdictions may weaken their role as representative
source countries and move them closer to the OECD approach573. This could lead to a
transformation in the existing international tax landscape, where “perhaps the role currently
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occupied by the BRICS, as a vocal ‘counterpoint’ to the OECD and developed countries
will be filled in the future by a new set of countries with a new acronym”574. Still, this close
alignment with the OECD depends on the continuing economic development of the BRICS
in the foreseeable future, which is not guaranteed.
However, even in their present stage of economic development – in which the importance
of source-based taxation is still a priority – the BRICS usually rely on OECD standards as
the accepted baseline against which they advocate a different policy. The transfer pricing
policies of the BRICS countries are not created in isolation but rather as a departure from
established practices, demonstrating the significant influence that the supranational tax
bodies (the OECD and the UN) have in these countries:
An organization or, more precisely, a pair of organizations that provide a
common starting point for negotiating (e.g. in the case of the two model
treaties) or discussion (in the case of the OECD guidance and initiatives)
can facilitate international tax policy conversations. If every discussion and
every negotiation started ‘at the beginning’, coordination and agreement
would likely be slower and the prospects for resolution likely diminished.
Additionally, to the extent that many jurisdictions (beyond OECD countries
and the BRICS) are not in a position to prepare their own models or draft
regulations or guidelines, the ability to access a comprehensive set of tax
materials can be valuable575.
Although several transfer pricing practices and interests of the BRICS are distinct from
those of the OECD countries, it is possible to note a general reliance on the OECD’s
framework and on the ALP. For instance, Brazil’s predetermined profit margins
methodology does not create a new system or principle, but rather reconciles the ALP
(prescribed in Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty) with a more practical approach.
Moreover, the Chinese and Indian dissonant transfer pricing policies examined above –
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such as LSAs – and their recognition by the international community were not developed
through a consensus between the BRICS, but through pressure on the UN to provide them
a space in the UN Practical Manual to express their practices and on the OECD to
incorporate some of these concepts in the BEPS initiative.

5.4

Conclusion

The BRICS have selected the ALP as the standard method in dealing with transfer pricing;
however, the interpretation and the application of this principle in each of the BRICS
countries is different. There are similarities in the challenges presented by the ALP for the
BRICS, such as the difficulty in finding comparables and in establishing appropriate
transfer prices for intangible transactions. Nonetheless, there is no coordination between
the BRICS regarding the solutions they found for these challenges, except for China and
India, which seem to cooperate and coordinate their positions on LSAs.
The BRICS identification as a group as well as their resistance to being merely norm takers
have influenced the public debate on international transfer pricing policies. Therefore,
these countries have had an impact on the works of relevant tax organizations, such as the
UN and the OECD. However, because of a series of limitations – particularly regarding the
differences among them – the BRICS do not seem to be able to act as a ‘unified front’ or
to dismantle the current international transfer pricing regime.
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Chapter 6

6

Conclusion

This thesis has examined the role of the BRICS in the governance of the international
transfer pricing regime as well as their potential for cooperation in rebalancing the existing
power structures in international taxation.
Transfer pricing is a complex issue for tax administrations and taxpayers across the world.
The ALP and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have frequently been adopted as the
basis for transfer pricing systems, being considered by some scholars as the international
consensus on transfer pricing. Nevertheless, over time, the ALP, as applied and interpreted
under the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, has encountered a series of limitations and
challenges in its practical application, especially for countries that are not members of the
OECD, such as the BRICS. Recognizing these difficulties, in 2013, the UN developed a
Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries. The contributions from
four of the BRICS countries – Brazil, China, India and South Africa – to the last part of the
UN Practical Manual were examined in Chapter 2, concentrating on the practices of these
countries that were not aligned with the OECD’s approach.
When the BRICS countries were grouped in 2001, they did not share a collective identity,
but rather an identity that was established by others. Indeed, the BRICS have few common
characteristics, differing from each other in terms of their political, legal, geographic,
economic and cultural structures. Nonetheless, based on a common self-identity as
emerging economies576, the BRICS have built an extensive network of interactions, having
institutionalized important areas of cooperation where they share common interests. This
overall perspective regarding relevant characteristics of the BRICS as individual countries
and as a group were discussed in Chapter 3, which set the stage for an analysis of the
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This self-identity the BRICS have as emerging economies is accompanied by the idea that the
existing governance of the international tax regime does not take into consideration the interests of
emerging countries, which, consequently, may be an obstacle for their fully development.
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potential for cooperation between these countries in Chapter 5.
In particular, Chapter 3 focused on the BRICS performance as a group, where the BRICS
countries representatives have agreed on the need for cooperation and coordination of their
international tax policies for countering tax evasion and tax avoidance. In this respect, one
of the areas identified by the BRICS heads of tax authorities577 for extending their
cooperation was the development of international standards on transfer pricing considering
the needs of developing countries in general and, more specifically, the aspirations of the
BRICS countries. However, considering all the above-mentioned differences between
these countries, the question that arises is if it is possible for the BRICS to coordinate their
positions in order to develop a new (or reform the existing) international standard on
transfer pricing. Chapter 4 – which essentially explores the transfer pricing rules of the five
BRICS countries – addresses this question.
A comparison between the transfer pricing rules of the BRICS countries demonstrates that
all of them, explicitly or implicitly, follow the ALP in their domestic laws, at least in theory.
Nevertheless, the practical application of the principle, particularly as designed by the
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, presents challenges for the tax authorities of all the
BRICS, to a lesser or greater extent. The commonalities and dissimilarities between their
transfer pricing practices were extensively discussed in Chapter 5. Fundamentally,
although these countries face similar difficulties, the solutions developed by each one of
them are different. In this respect, this research did not find indications of a coordination
between the five BRICS countries’ tax laws towards developing one common international
transfer pricing standard. Only China and India have been able to coordinate their positions
on transfer pricing matters such as LSAs and intangibles in order to achieve a greater global
influence.
Even though the BRICS have not developed a unified position regarding transfer pricing
or a formal coordination between their practices, it is possible to observe a sense of
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As discussed in page 36, the BRICS heads of tax authorities held regular meetings – also called
Heads of Revenue Meetings – where they discuss potential areas for cooperation and exchange
opinions towards reaching a globally fair tax system.
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cooperation and support among them. One evidence of this cooperation is found in their
involvement in the UN Subcommittee on Transfer Pricing, where, while they did not agree
with the individual practices expressed by each of them (i.e., their transfer pricing
methodologies were dissimilar), they cooperated to have the inclusion of Chapter 10 (Part
D in the 2017 version) in the UN Practical Manual as a space for them to describe their
distinctive approaches to transfer pricing578. Thus, the most successful form of cooperation
between the BRICS has been challenging international transfer pricing standards that are
inadequate for their national interests as emerging economies.
Individually, the aspiration for a stronger influence in the development of the international
transfer pricing regime is also noticeable among the BRICS countries. The participation of
the BRICS in supranational tax bodies – even acting only as observers – suggests how these
countries attempt to use their status as members of the BRICS in order to, independently,
achieve a more influential position in the international transfer pricing debate. In this
respect, Chapter 5 reviewed some influences the BRICS countries had in the development
of the UN Practical Manual and the G20/OECD BEPS initiative. A comparative analysis
between the proposed BEPS Actions and the BRICS transfer pricing rules indicated that
the BRICS countries had an individual impact on the outcomes of the BEPS initiative.
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that, based on their differences and limitations,
currently, the BRICS are not an imminent threat to the dominance of the existing power
structures in international taxation, specifically the OECD. An analysis of the BRICS
transfer pricing laws in combination with their latest institutional developments suggests
that these countries do not sufficiently cooperate and coordinate their positions to oppose
the OECD in an organized manner. Thus, the BRICS are unlikely to, as a cohesive group,
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The contributions from four of the five BRICS to the UN Practical Manual, more than merely
describing their approaches to transfer pricing, represents one important step in their wish for a
stronger voice in the international transfer pricing scenario. According to Diane Ring, “in a Manual
targeted at developing countries, the decision to include a chapter highlighting the work of these
four countries signals their role as leaders for developing countries seeking successful resolutions
to tax problems. This message is particularly apparent given that some of the practices of the
featured countries were not closely aligned with the arm’s length message that permeated the
Manual”. 578 Ring, supra note 108 at 484.
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create their own transfer pricing framework or model.
Nevertheless, despite their difficulties in formally and cohesively developing a detailed
transfer pricing policy as a group, it is clear that the BRICS have the potential ability to
influence the direction of the international transfer pricing regime. Indeed, the BRICS
countries individual positions as well as their participation in other international
organizations and initiatives, such as the UN, the G20 and the G20/OECD BEPS, have
added new perspectives to the international tax debate. In this respect, the OECD’s new
international taxation approach regarding collaboration and multilateral action – as
demonstrated in the BEPS initiative – was an important step in the BRICS quest for having
a stronger voice in international tax governance.
Even though the BRICS have been active in cooperating with supranational tax bodies,
including the OECD, this does not mean that these countries are aligning with the
traditional and dominant powers in international tax governance. Specifically in regards to
the OECD, while there is the possibility that the BRICS reach sufficient levels of
development and join the organization, this is not an opportunity expected to happen in the
foreseeable future. However, even as non-member countries, the BRICS have acquired a
significant voice and influence in the OECD, who is also interested in having them included
in the organization’s decisions.
According to the above analysis, one of the possible future outcomes for the BRICS
countries in the international tax landscape is to continue to act as an informal group,
focusing on their individual participation in organizations and initiatives in which they are
already involved. This way, even not having a coordinated transfer pricing policy, they can
use the power of their association and still be able to further increase their influence in the
international tax regime.
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